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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
With the ongoing strengthening of the authoritarian regime in Russia, oppositional           
movements actively apply ICT (Information & Communications Technology) as a tool           
for pursuing their goals. ICT is especially relevant for those movements, which for             
certain reasons are limited in the usage of more conventional methods of political             
mobilization, or rely on them by choice. On March 26 2017 a massive anti corruption               
protest sweep across Russia. The protest was inspired by Alexei Navalny and triggered             
by investigation conducted by his Anti-corruption foundation. The target of          
investigation - ‘corrupt empire of the prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’. Core           
mobilization was conducted by ICT. Though this research focuses on earlier period of             
time, foundation for such conversion of online into offline was laid with emergence of              
ICT as tool for mobilization in early 2010. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny are two prominent leaders of Russian           
opposition, who also can be seen as the most progressive in terms of their approach to                
mobilization via ICT. On the one hand, they are considerably limited in conventional             
methods of mobilization, because the current Russian political regime constrains          
oppositional forces in order to minimize their access to the state bodies, as well as the                
effect of their mobilization efforts. On the other hand, such an active usage of ICTs is                
often justified by the progressive images of these political actors, the nature of their              
target groups, and finally by rational choice in favor of this unconventional method of              
mobilization. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny have a complex approach to ICT as a tool              
of mobilization with websites and social media as their pilar platforms. With a goal to               
gain in-depth understanding of one of role of these pillars, this research focuses on              
websites operated by Khodorkovsky and Navalny. Websites and social media          
complement each other and it is common practice of well-established political           
organisations to have both, because with true integration of them highly synergetic            
effect can be reached. 
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Cases of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny have certain important features in            
common, which allows to put them into one research framework. Apart from            
similarities caused of being part of Russian opposition, two important characteristics           
should be brought up. In particular, both these actors were involved in politically             
motivated criminal prosecutions and both of them do not have official political forces             
(i.e. registered political parties). Though Khodorkovsky and Navalny share these          
characteristics, their location represents a salient difference, which draws attention for           
this research. Location in which two political actors operate, following common major            
goal, may significantly influence their ICT mobilization strategies. While Alexei          
Navalny operates within Russia, Mikhail Khodorkovsky is forced to pursue his agenda            
from exile. In a broad understanding, these political actors share the same strategic goal              
of fundamental political change in Russia, but the profound difference in their location             
has such a detrimental power, that Khodorkovsky and Navalny tend to differ in their              
strategies regarding ICT as a tool of mobilization. This research addresses the given             
statement in the form of the main hypothesis - if location of oppositional movement              
leadership is different, their website-based ICT mobilization strategies tend to differ.  
Thus, the outlined puzzle leads to the following research question: ​what effect does             
location of oppositional movements leadership have on their ICT mobilization          
strategies in authoritarian regimes.  
Meanwhile presence of other factors that might cause difference in website-based ICT            
mobilization strategies also have to be recognised. Not only because logical reasoning,            
but because empirical evidence gathered through this research also confirmed relevance           
of the following factors. Mikhail Khodorkovsky have different financial resources for           
conducting his political activities, that naturally should have an impact on the respective             
website-based ICT mobilization strategy. Research indicates that location also         
influences this strategy in certain manner. Two political actors are involved in different             
types of activities that result in significant deviations in their website-based           
mobilization strategies. The more primary question of what other factors cause them to             
engage in different activities is a subject for a different research, but here it is argued                
that location is one of important contributing factors. Type of leadership and level of              
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personalization of their oppositional movements also have to be acknowledged.          
Empirical examination confirmed that they also influence the given strategies.          
Meanwhile, it is also worth asking what influences the level of personalization? Can             
location contribute to it? Research attempted try to answer to the last question.  
Nevertheless, this is a factor oriented study which seeks to understand whether location             
matters in regard of website-based ICT mobilization strategies. Since ICT mobilization           
strategies are complex and multidimensional, each strategy had to be clearly delineated            
during analysis, and treated as a subordinate dependant variable. In such a manner it              
became possible to shed light on impact of location on each of ICT mobilization              
strategies; assess scope and nature of this impact. Results of research demonstrates that             
identified website-based ICT mobilization strategies are influenced by location to a           
different degree and make respective assumptions about presence of the other factors. 
The obvious presence of other factors and potential of this research result in need to               
recognise its limitations. In order to clearly prove that location indeed has such a              
determinative power that it is a primary factor that causes differences in website-based             
ICT mobilization strategies, different cases would be necessary. Instead of two cases            
with two different political leaders, it would be necessary to identify one leader who at               
one point of time was conducting website-based ICT mobilization strategies from inside            
of country, and in the other point of time - from exile. Even in such case other factors                  
that could potentially cause difference has to be taken into account. 
Apart from the high-scale matters addressed above, website-based ICT mobilization          
strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny not only depend on their location, but also can              
be influenced by political conditions in Russia at a given period of time. ICT              
mobilization strategies in general are not hold constant and political actors adjust them             
based on their current priorities, as well as external political factors. Since both             
Khodorkovsky and Navalny are pursuing access to the state bodies (either directly or             
indirectly), they actively use ICT to conduct mobilization during elections. As a result,             
elections can prompt these political actors to prioritise certain website-based ICT           
mobilization strategies. Russian Parliamentary Elections 2016 are the latest national          
elections and they are in the spotlight of the given research. This time factor and               
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consequent fluid nature of ICT mobilizations strategies results in need to move research             
further and ask additional research question - ​what effect do elections have on the              
type of ICT mobilization strategies of oppositional movements leadership in          
authoritarian regimes.  
The notion of elections should be understood here as the period of time, which              
encompasses pre-electoral and post-electoral phases of elections, divided by the election           
day. Campaigning is conducted during pre-electoral phase, while reflection on results of            
elections and follow-up activities are conducted during the post-electoral phase. In           
terms of mass mobilization, the latter has no less significance than ​former​. 
Consequently, the given research is investigating causal relationship between location          
of two oppositional movements and types of their website-based ICT mobilization           
strategies in two different points in time. In order to see if phases of electoral period                
have impact on type of website-based ICT mobilization strategies, the following           
hypothesis is going to be tested: ​during the pre-electoral phase of electoral period, ICT              
mobilization strategies of oppositional movements leadership, located in different         
places, tend to converge. Elections here play the role of a conditional variable, that              
influences the size of IV impact on DV. In this case, elections are expected to mitigate                
impact of location of oppositional movements leadership on their ICT mobilization           
strategies, and ultimately, might cause them to converge.  
This hypothesis is based on the following reasons. First, both Khodorkovsky and            
Navalny compete for public support and votes. Second, target groups of both political             
actors intersect, because they belong to general supporters of political opposition. As a             
result, the rationale behind prioritizing certain ICT strategies may be based on what             
works better during electoral campaigning period. The research is looking at two            
periods of time that lasted for six month: ​March 18, 2016 - September 18, 2016 as a                 
pre-electoral phase, and ​September 18, 2016 - March 19, 2017 ​as a post-electoral             
phase. 
Here are arrow diagrams which demonstrate research puzzle: 
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From theoretical perspective, this research makes a contribution into combination of           
several concepts regarding ICT mobilization strategies and putting them into a           
framework of interrelated elements. While a significant number of researchers          
conducted in depth inquiries into different ICT mobilization strategies, there is a clear             
lack of holistic approach to website-based ICT mobilization strategies, predominantly          
used by political actors in combination of numerous elements.  
In empirical terms this research takes a task of comprehensive analysis of website-based             
ICT mobilization strategies applied by Khodorkovsky and Navalny during one-year          
period between March 206 and March 2017. In order to understand which            
website-based ICT mobilization strategies and to what extent were affected by different            
location, each of the strategies is addressed separately. For that purpose this research             
took an ambitious task of in depth analysis and categorisation of all website-based ICT              
mobilization strategies used by selected political actors. Instead of taking assumptions           
about which strategies could be more affected by location and focusing on them, a              
complex endeavour to mapping all of them was undertaken. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual framework 
 
Section 2.1 
ICT as a tool of political mobilization 
 
The politics is renowned for application of ever widening variety of tools for its              
functioning and pursuing its goals. With a growing significance of ICT in all aspects of               
daily life, politics had taken a strong grasp on this modern tool. It is a task of social                  
science to understand a vibrantly developing intersection between politics and ICT.           
Research is able not only to reveal which approaches turn out to be more effective, but                
also to investigate side effects of often utilitarian application of ICT by political actors.  
Political mobilization refers to ‘the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and            
groups induce other people to participate’ (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993: 25) This            
concise definition coined in early 90s is relevant today because the major point of              
political mobilization has not changed. ICT refers to the term that ‘...stresses the role of               
unified communications and the integration of telecommunications (telephone lines and          
wireless signals), computers as well as software, middleware, storage, and audio-visual           
systems, which enable users to access, store, transmit, and manipulate information’           
(Baum, 2014:9).  
A number of authors recognise the ability of ICT to transcend both physical and              
traditional boundaries and to allow politics to reach a greater number of individuals.             
(Breuer and Farooq, 2012; Diamond, 2010). With help of ICT greater number of             
individuals can be reached for lower cost, which makes this tools even more attractive.              
Especially for oppositional actors who are limited in financial or operational abilities for             
campaigning. This point confirmed by research conducted by Krueger, in which he            
argues ‘that the Internet reduces mobilizing institutions’ communication costs’.         
(Krueger, 2006: 760) 
ICT also enables political actors to transform traditional methods of mobilization. For            
example, during campaigning political actors distributes printing campaigning material,         
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while they use ICT to digitalize the same materials and distribute them online among a               
larger audience. Apart from such mere digitization of traditional mobilization          
mechanisms, ICT offers a wide range of new tools that allows political actors to bring               
their efforts on a different qualitative level. Meanwhile according to the Krueger the             
distinctive characteristics of the Internet suggest that the long-standing patterns of           
traditional mobilization may not be reproduced online’ (Krueger, 2006: 760)’. In           
particular, the lack of real life interpersonal outreach to members of target audience has              
to be brought up here. Interpersonal communication remains one of the pillars of             
political campaigning, and online mobilization strategies are approached by political          
actors with clear intention of conversion of their impact into offline activities. Despite             
considerations that online form communication deteriorates face-to-face form, studies         
confirm that rather former is rather accompanies later (Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2010:46). 
The other group of researchers highlights one more important feature of the internet,             
which should be considered as ‘...a contested terrain, used by left, right, and center of               
both dominant cultures and subcultures to promote their own agendas and interests.’            
(Kahn and Kellner, 2006: 720). At first glance, in authoritarian regimes, the internet is              
contested by ruling and oppositional forces. Meanwhile in case of Russia, certain            
oppositional groups may also compete for attention of overlapping target audiences,           
because that what will define under whose banners online users would come to the              
streets. Finally, a number of authors escape cyber utopian belief in democratizing power             
of the Internet and consequently ICT (Heeks and Seo-Zindy, 2013; Morozov, 2011;            
Diamond, 2010; Salter, 2003). It is a question for a different inquiry, to what extent               
Russian oppositional leaders recognise limitations and dangers of online mobilization in           
authoritarian regime, and adapt to respective conditions.  
Larry Diamond also highlights that ‘in sharp contrast to radio and television, the news              
ICTs are two-way and even multiway forms of communication’ (Diamond, 2010: 70).            
Such unique feature along with rapid transfer allowed by modern quality of internet             
allows political actors to reach immediate mobilization. This researcher also recognises           
a high potential of ICT mobilization tools in ‘widening public sphere, creating a more              
pluralistic and autonomous arena of news, commentary, and information’ (Diamond,          
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2010: 71). In addition he points out that ‘the new ICTs are also a powerful instruments                
for transparency and accountability, documenting and deterring abuses of human rights           
and democratic procedures' (Diamond, 2010: 71).  
This research seeks to produce holistic knowledge about website-based ICT          
mobilization strategies of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny oppositional         
movements. These strategies consist of multiple elements, which for each oppositional           
movement are present in a different forms and to a certain degree. While scholars have               
been looking at a differential elements of ICT mobilization strategies, there is lack of              
research that would look at complex of them in a comprehensive manner. Consequently,             
an appropriate instrument for analysis of was created in the framework of this research.              
The chapter on empirical examination demonstrates to what extent political actors under            
investigation engage in the these activities. This research is driven by empirical data and              
the following categories were created in the process of empirical examination. For this             
purposes structural information of all websites operated by Khodorkovsky and Navalny           
during the electoral period was extracted. Each element was assigned to one or several              
categories of ICT mobilization strategies. In principle, the following question was asked            
regarding each element of each website - What purpose this element serves from the              
perspective of mobilization? On the initial stage of analysis, depending on the answer to              
this question a respective category was created. In the course of this process some              
categories were merged, while others had to clearly delineated though the looked            
similar in the beginning. Categorical delineation was based on the their distinctive            
delineation on the websites themselves.  
Here is the list of website-based ICT mobilization strategies, endogenously created           
during the work with empirical data. It corresponds to categories presented in the             
extended version of Table 1 in Appendix 2. 
1. Countering hegemonic discourse 
a. content prepared by political actors (ordered by websites administration) 
b. content prepared by users (approved by websites administration) 
2. Fostering deliberation online 
a. one way interaction 
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b. two way interaction 
3. Shaping idea of a political personality 
4. Exposing perpetrations 
5. Exposing and addressing issues with population well- being 
a. Collection of complaints from population 
b. Demonstration of impact of solving problems 
6. News and media activities 
7. Informing about non-project events 
a. about future events 
b. about past events 
8. Recruiting 
a. Activists 
b. Volunteers  
9. Fundraising 
10. Collecting users personal data 
a. Registration of user accounts for online activities on a website 
b. Providing of data for participation in offline activities 
11. Conducting legal projects 
a. Legal projects 
b. Legislative initiatives 
12. Conducting electoral projects 
a. Candidates application for support 
b. Channel for users to provide support to candidates 
c. other forms of engagement in elections 
 
Based on empirical examination with dichotomous level of precision, nine out of twelve             
strategies can be considered as common for both Khodorkovsky and Navalny.           
Meanwhile, with introduction of higher level of precision, more complex picture can be             
drawn and this picture is in detailed revealed in the chapter on empirical examination.              
For the purposes of the given chapter, which addresses theoretical framework of the             
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research, it reasonable to operate within the dichotomous approach to ICT mobilization            
strategies. It essentially answers the question, whether certain strategy is used by a             
certain political actor or not 
If a political leader wants to deliver a message by means of a website, he or she needs to                   
use content. Content is represented by any information published on a website in             
multiple forms: textual, visual, video or audio. 
Political actors under investigation also use content, which serves multiple purposes.           
Since both Khodorkovsky and Navalny operate in authoritarian regime, one of key            
purpose of information delivered in the form of content is countering hegemonic            
discourse. In framework of this research, countering hegemonic discourse is identified           
as a first ICT mobilization strategy applied by both actors. 
Before elaborating on this strategy it is necessary to return to classical explanation of              
concept of discourse. In particularly coined by those who at the origin of discursive              
theory. Laclau and Mouffe (in Howarth, 2010: 311) argued that, ‘a discursive structure             
is not a merely “cognitive” or “contemplative” entity; it is an articulatory practice which              
constitutes and organizes social relations’. Howarth himself sums up that ‘discourse           
refers to particular systems of meaningful or articulatory practice’ (Howarth, 2010:           
313). This understanding is as relevant in terms of websites as it is relevant for other                
forms of discourse channeling. Moreover, websites as a platform for mobilization via            
ICT, possess advance quality of two way interaction and support ongoing contribution            
to the discourse. Websites with supported two-way interaction serve as good example of             
a platform, on which poth cognitive and articulatory practice can be observed. 
In the nexus of countering hegemonic discourse, the term hegemony also shall be             
addressed. The article published by Howarth in 2010 covers interrelated concepts of            
discourse and hegemony. He argues that ‘hegemony can be seen as a form of rule that                
can elucidate the way in which a regime, practice or policy holds sway over a set of                 
subjects by winning their con sent or securing their compliance’ (Howarth, 2010: 317).             
In authoritarian regime like Russian, information space is actively used area where            
hegemony can be both practiced and strengthened (Alexander, 2003). Back in early            
2000th Alexander stated that ‘the emergence of Russian pro-government online news           
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media capable of overpowering independent voices…’ (Alexander, 2003). Today this          
capability only strengthened and Russian authorities took a strong grip on media space             
in Russia, including the online information space. (Oates, 2014). As Oats also argues,             
in conditions were television turned out to be the main channel for hegemonic             
discourse, the internet became the main terrain where this hegemony is challenged.            
(​Oates, 2014). In such conditions it is natural for Russian oppositional leaders to stake              
on website-based ICT as tool for countering hegemonic discourse. 
Both actors provide venues for users deliberation online about variety of raised issues             
both on the website and connected social media. According, to Price (2009),            
deliberating theory has ‘functional utility of online “discussion” for political          
deliberation’. While, evidence suggests that both Khodorkovsky and Navalny use their           
platforms for fundraising via a fundraising platforms (‘donate button’), Navalny relies           
on donations much more, which in result makes his strategies more creative. In             
particular, micro-donations play significant role in fundraising efforts of Alexei          
Navalny. According to Garret, small actions may lead to a greater sense of obligation              
(2006), that might explain a more dedicated supporters backing Navalny’s activities.  
Anti-Corruption Foundation put a great effort into coverage of the corruption cases and             
communicating their findings to the larger audience. Conceptually this approach can be            
explained from the perspective of the witnessing at distance. According to this            
approach, the sight of perpetrations conducted by ‘political or institutional agents and            
the possibility of widely reproducing and distributing related information represent          
effective means of controlling abuses of the powerful’ (Ribeiro, 1996). It is also related              
to the mobilization of shame, ‘where the behaviour of target actors is held up to the                
bright light’ of public scrutiny’ (Keck, Sikkink, 1999). 
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Section 2.2 
Location of oppositional movements leadership: Mikhail Khodorkovsky in the         
exile vs. Alexei Navalny in the country 
 
Location of oppositional movement leadership affects multiple aspects of their          
operation. Ability to be present inside of the country, on population of which political              
leaders are targeting their mobilization efforts vs. inability to be physically present            
there, triggers a chain of implications starting of the nature of communication with             
supporters and ending with logistical and legal aspects of the operation. 
From the perspective of social science, location of Mikhail Khodorkovsky represents           
the most difference because exile is an abnormality in regard of political mobilization.             
Mikhail Khodorkovsky appeared to be in exile after ten years of imprisonment due to              
prosecution on the number of politically motivated cases. (Olcott, 2004). Currently he is             
residing in London and in particular works on his umbrella project ‘Open Russia’. Open              
Russia used to be a traditional non governmental organisation with its regional branches             
around Russia, but after its assets were arrested following prosecution of Mikhail            
Khodorkovsky, the activities of the foundation were put on hold. Shortly after his             
release and moving to exile, Khodorkovsky announced relaunch of the project. 
Exile of Mikhail Khodorkovsky started on December 20, 2013, when he arrived to             
Berlin. Khodorkovsky applied for pardon due to the prolonged sickness of his mother,             
and this reason was stated by Vladimir Putin when he announced about his intention to               
release Mikhail Khodorkovsky on his traditional press-conference held one day prior to            
release. Meanwhile, on the day of release all members of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's            
family was in Moscow and he never had a chance to see his mother before her death                 
later in 2014. By this time Khodorkovsky was unable to come to Russia again due to the                 
threat of new arrest and prosecution (khodorkovsky.ru). 
The first public speech was pronounced by the oppositional leader already in 2013             
during protest demonstrations on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev, Ukraine. That was            
a start of critique from exile of Mikhail Khodorkovsky vis-a-vis current political regime             
in Russia and its actions. 
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In September 2014 Khodorkovsky relaunched the Open Russia project, that initially           
was planned as an information platform. Creation of alternative information field in the             
Russian society was announced as a paramount purpose of the project. 
During first year in exile Khodorkovsky was try to understand that socio-political            
situation in russia and researched public opinion. When he understood that there is no              
perspective for fast change of political regime he decided that he will need a media               
platform that will allow he to communicate with society. At that point personal website              
Khodorkovsky.ru, was the only website he had, but was clear that a platform of a               
different kind will be needed.  
After residing in several places around Europe (in particularly Zurich) Mikhail           
Khodorkovsky settled in London in june 2015, where currently Open Russia           
headquarters and the debate club are located (Жигулев, 2016). Open Russia was            
designed to take this role and initially it was branded as Khodorkovsky project. On the               
first stage Open Russia was very dynamic, a lot of projects and approaches were tested.               
In particular, project University was considered as a success. At the same time, The              
chief editor of the Open Russia website Veronica Kutsylo complained that the project             
was gaining increasingly more vertical structure of management (Жигулев, 2016).          
After poor performance of the Parnas party in elections to regional parliaments 2015,             
the idea to make an electoral project came to Khodorkovsky, which meant explicit             
involvement into political activities, though after the release he stated that is going to              
conduct only civic activities. It was decided that candidates for new project Open             
Elections also should be recruited via website. Though many thought that no candidate             
would want to announced that he or she were supported by Khodorkovsky, around 500              
people applied to the project. The project required significant financial contribution           
from Khodorkovsky. It was reported that on all candidates it was planned to spend              
around 3 million dollars. Meanwhile, in 2016 Khodorkovsky for the firs again appeared             
in the list of the wealthiest people in Russia (Жигулев, 2016). According the             
high-ranking representative of Khodorkovsky team, who gave interview in the          
framework of this research, the movement Open Russian emerged because the basis of             
energy of 23 candidates supported during the first round of the project 2016. After this               
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elections, the project was redesigned for Regional Elections 2017 and started with            
‘Moscow School of Candidates - a large educational project with targetted at 400 of              
participants. The candidates who will successfully graduate from the school will be            
provided with respective support from Mikhail Khodorkovsky (ov.openrussia.org). 
Being in exile, Khodorkovsky is under interrelation of different forces and in certain             
sense he is exposed to influence of international forces. Russian pro-governmental           
media often advances the idea that he is funded by the USA (ren.tv). Specifically,              
according to research conducted by Sznajder and Roniger, ‘exile is four-tiered structure:            
shaped around the interplay between the expelling states, the exiles and the hosting             
countries and international public sphere as a fourth tier, which started to modulate the              
ways in which other tiers interact’ (2009). In the case Khodorkovsky, Russia is a              
expelling state, with regime that recognises ambitions of Khodorkovsky and tries to            
deteriorate his activities. Though he resides in the United Kingdom, european Union on             
the whole should be considered as hosting state. That was especially relevant before the              
Brexit. And the final tier is a public sphere, which here can be basically derived to                
Russia and the rest of the world. 
The case of Alexei Navalny is more conventional because he resides in Russia and              
though both political leaders target their mobilization efforts on Russian society,           
Navalny is a subject to different environment. The last attack on the politician that              
resulted in a serious injury of his eye confirms this (Meduza.io, 2017). In order to do an                 
operation on his injured eye, Alexei Navalny first in a five years was able to leave the                 
country in May 2017 (Meduza.io, 2017). Criously, location and status that it implies put              
significant restriction on both political actors, While Mikhail Khodorkovsky is shut           
outside of Russia, Alexei Navalny was shut inside for five years. Since the launch of               
criminal proceedings against him. After his considerable success in Moscow Mayoral           
Elections 2013, the political career and ambitions of the politician were escalating.            
Presidential campaign 2018 became the pinnacle of his activities. In 2012 Popescu            
characterised Alexei Navalny, as ‘an anti corruption crusader and Russia’s most popular            
blogger, is an emerging star of the Russian opposition and widely seen as the              
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anti-Putinism’ best hope’ (2012). This characteristic still can be applied to this            
politician. 
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Chapter 3. 
Empirical Examination 
 
Section 3.1 
Methods used for identification, collection and analysis of data 
 
This section explains what methods were used for identification and collection of data             
regarding ICT mobilization strategies for both selected cases, as well as methods for             
analysis of respective empirical data. 
This research is looking at the front-end ICT mobilization practices in order to             
understand ICT mobilization strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny as a part of            
observable behaviour. On the back stage, these political actors may use such back-end             
ICT mobilization practices as databases - CRM (Constituency or Customer Relationship           
Management Systems). Investigation of back-end practices is not a part of this research,             
unless elements of these practices become a part of observable behaviour. For example,             
collection of data is often done by means of publicly available platforms (e.g. creation              
of account on Open Russia website).  
Primary data that demonstrates ICT mobilization strategies was collected from front           
ends of respective ICT platforms - Khodorkovsky and Navalny websites. Social media            
pages are analysed as sources supplementary to websites. Meanwhile, attention certainly           
has to be paid to social media, because it amplifies affect of websites, and actors under                
investigation are well aware of it. Khodorkovsky and Navalny are able to reach their              
goals, because they are directly and fundamentally connected to social media.  
Since the research is looking at two periods of time in the past, it is necessary to collect                  
data about archived versions of respective websites and activity on social media during             
these periods of time.  
The main Internet Archive ​Wayback Machine (WBM), is used as a main source for data               
collection (Eltgrowth, 2009). The Internet Archive allows to see what previous versions            
of websites used to look like. Web archives are focused on preservation of main pages               
of archived versions of website and they sometimes do not archive specific web pages.              
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In order to support this major source of data, HTML codes of insufficiently archived              
webpages were analyzed and compared to codes of uptodate webpages in order to find              
the evidence. In addition, cached versions of certain web pages and official previous             
versions of certain websites were employed for data collection. Search engines Yahoo is             
good sources of cached web pages, because Unlike Google, this engine conduct cashing             
less often, which results in out-dated cash versions of websites. For purposes of             
post-hoc analysis of websites this disadvantage, turns into advantage. 
Cached versions of websites on indicated services are provided with dates - services             
informs a user that a given snapshot reflects how a web page appeared on a certain date.                 
The main Russian search engine Yandex also provides cached web pages, but            
unfortunately it does not indicate when snapshot was taken. From the perspective of this              
research it is important to have this information, thus usage of Yandex cache has to be                
omitted. 
Post-hoc analysis of the website connected to significant difficulties in regard of data             
collection. Work with archived versions of the website is similar to work with historical              
artifacts. It possesses certain difficulties that prevent research from achieving a           
complete picture. The WBM contains a limited number of number of archived versions             
of Khodorkovsky and Navalny websites.  
Collection of data about openrussia.org was the most challenging. WBM saved           
openrussia.org 49 times between March 18, 2016 and March 18, 2017. Meanwhile, here             
website was archived with certain discrepancy. During pre-electoral phase, WMB saved           
openrussia.org only 15 times. For the rest 34 times the website was saved during the               
second period of time. In addition, many archived pages are are not available on the               
WMB - after attempt to access it service gives ‘403 Forbidden’ message. It can be               
related to server issues or web crawling permissions. 
Web archives and caching are designed mostly to preserve content of websites, rather             
than their structure. Archived versions sometimes distort website structure, especially          
when it comes to such elements as dropdown menus and popup windows. Information             
about such elements is reflected in webpage HTML code, and it was used a supportive               
sources of data where it was applicable. Consequently, the given research methods            
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present a certain level of error. In the given research, level of error is reduced by usage                 
of alternative sources of data: official old versions of websites (for example,            
old.openrussia.org) and cached versions of webpages from the search engine Yahoo. 
For increased quality of post-hoc analysis of websites, data has to be collected during              
the identified period of time, which requires highly proactive approach. In the given             
case, data collection would have to start in March 18, 2016. 
In order to test result of data collection and analysis, in-depth interview with             
high-ranking representative of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was conducted after observable         
empirical data was already collected. This additional method of gathering empirical data            
was selected, because interviews are semi-structured, flexible and continuous. This          
method also allows capturing more of relevant data, because the researcher has only a              
general plan of inquiry without a rigid set of questions. Respondent’s answers to the              
initial questions are intended to shape the subsequent questions. Questionnaire used for            
this interview is provided in the Appendix 1. 
The interview insisted that she stays anonymous. Due to employment in the National             
Democratic Institute (NDI), thesis author had to refrain from interviewing Alexei           
Navalny representatives. Alexei Navalny specifically stated that he does not want to            
have any relationship with NDI. Thus even mere outreach for interviewing purposes            
could cast a shadow on Navalny because of employment issue. The Institute is included              
to the list of ​Undesirable Organisations​ since March 17 2016.  
Apart from publicly available data, archived versions of the websites may be stored by              
ICT teams of Khodorkovsky and Navalny themselves. During the negotiations for           
interviewing, thus data was requested along with access to strategic documents that            
determine ICT practices of actors under investigation, meanwhile due to sensitive nature            
of this data no access was provided.  
Factual information about ICT practices also can be useful for analysis of ICT practices.              
In particular, website metrics is collected from ​Alexa Internet​, an openly available            
analytical tool. This tool provides data about websites traffic and global rankings. Such             
factual data as global rankings is needed not to compare success of websites of              
Khodorkovsky and Navalny, but to compare metrics of websites that belong to projects             
22 
of the same actor. Low ranking of one website and much higher ranking of the other                
website give basis to imply that the level of investment committed to certain projects              
differs. High metrics would tell that certain websites have more strategic priority level.  
The next step after collecting the data is its analyzing. Due to their complexity and               
variety, analysis of the websites requires a complex approach. Considerable amount of            
research is done in the area of user perception of websites. Meanwhile, this research is               
looking at the idea of websites of people who administered their creation. These people              
may include Khodorkovsky and Navalny themselves, members of their ICT teams, and            
finally developers. Analysis of the website comprises both structural and factual           
information. ‘Structural information may help understanding the organization of the          
pages in the site’, which in its turn helped to understand strategy behind its structure               
(​Ricca and Tonella: 2000).  
Significant attention has been paid towards factors of success of corporate websites, in             
particularly from perspective of advertisement. Though websites of political leaders do           
not exist in sake of direct profit, they also exist in order to ‘sell’ ideas, political                
personality of a leader, as well as urge users for action - ‘purchase’ can here be                
substituted by ‘voting’ or ‘self-recruitment’ of activists. Many other parallels can be            
drawn between politics and commerce. Study conducted by McMillan, Hwang and Lee            
(2003) suggests that ‘the effect of structural variables, such as features and message             
strategy, and perceived variables, such as involvements and perceived interactivity,          
have strong impact on users attitudes towards a website’ (2003). Though this research             
does not look at the users perception of the websites under scrutiny, it is worthwhile to                
suggest that if Khodorkovsky and Navalny are aware of positive effect of certain             
structural features on users of their websites, they would opt for implementing them.             
Nexus of users and website creators is marked by constant bilateral influence of             
counterparts.  
In the framework of this research, collection and analysis of data about websites is done               
based on the reverse engineering approach. In the broad understanding, ‘reverse           
engineering is the process of extracting the knowledge or design blue-prints from            
anything man-made.’ (​Eilam, 2011: 3). Since websites are also human-made, this           
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method can be as successfully applied to their analysis, as to analysis of physical              
objects. ‘Reverse engineering is usually conducted to obtain missing knowledge, ideas,           
and design philosophy when such information is unavailable.’ ​(​Eilam, 2011: 3) 
In the terrain of World Wide Web, reverse engineering is often applied for analysis of a                
website’s technical component, i.e. its code. Meanwhile, apart from actual programing           
of a website, the fundamental idea of its purpose can also be analyzed by means of                
reverse engineering. Eilam states that ‘every time we access a website, we may invoke              
or interact with dozens of programs and code segments that are necessary to give us the                
intended look, feel, and behavior’. Based on this statement a website can be virtually              
broken down into two main components: technical - ‘programs and code segments’ and             
substantial - its ‘intended look, feel and behaviour’. While, traditionally reverse           
engineering would look at the technical component of a website, in the given case, this               
method is adopted to understand what rationale lies behind structural components of            
specific websites, which are created to serve political objectives of Khodorkovsky and            
Navalny. In the process of such reverse engineering, structural information about the            
websites is collected and analyzed. This information includes the organisation of the            
pages, modules, elements and website functionality on the whole ​(Ricca and Tonella:            
2000). In result, this method helps to explain why certain functions and elements are              
present on the websites and what deeper political objectives lie behind them. 
This research seeks to produce holistic knowledge about website-based ICT          
mobilization strategies of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny oppositional         
movements. These strategies consist of multiple elements, which for each oppositional           
movement were present in a different forms and to a certain degree. While scholars              
have been looking at a differential elements of ICT mobilization strategies, there is lack              
of research that would look at complex of them in a comprehensive manner.             
Consequently, an appropriate instrument for analysis of empirical data was created in            
the framework of this research. The Table 2, which follows below, was designed in              
order to capture ICT mobilization strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny in two            
selected periods of time. The table has two main axes - ‘Activities (strategies)’ and              
political actors - Khodorkovsky (Kh.) and Navalny (N.). The axes dedicated to political             
24 
actors is further processed into two periods of time for each actor. For each period of                
time it is indicated whether a respective strategy was used by a respective political              
actor. If ‘Yes’ in the cell is marked in a bold font it indicates that the given strategy was                   
well developed on websites of Khodorkovsky and Navalny. 
Twelve categories are listed under the axis ‘Strategies’. These categories were created            
inductively by applying reverse engineering method. Each website was deconstructed          
on key functional indicators defined through the process of operationalization. These           
indicators were in result grouped under one category. Twelve categories of           
website-based ICT mobilization strategies have been created based on analysis of each            
of the websites.  
For the creation of Table 2, websites were examined in the following order: websites of               
core projects (Open Russia and Anti-Corruption Foundation respectively), websites of          
sub projects, personal websites of political leader, and websites of projects in which             
actors were significantly involved. Elements of the websites, which correspond to each            
indicator of each category, are addressed in the traditional order - from up to down, and                
from left to right, or in the order suggested by logic. 
 
Table 1. ​Website-based ICT mobilization strategies of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei 
Navalny during electoral period: March 18, 2016 - March 18, 2017 
 
ICT ACTIVITIES (STRATEGIES) PRE-ELECTORAL 
PHASE 
POST-ELECTORAL 
PHASE 
Category Kh. N. Kh. N. 
  1.      Countering hegemonic discourse yes yes yes yes 
  2.      Fostering deliberation online yes yes yes yes 
  3.      Shaping idea of a political 
personality 
yes yes yes yes 
  4.      Perpetrations exposure no yes no yes 
  5.       Exposing and addressing issues 
with population well- being 
no yes no yes 
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  6.      News and media activities yes yes yes yes 
  7.      Informing about non-project events no no yes no 
  8.     Recruiting yes  yes  yes  yes  
  9.      Fundraising no  yes no yes 
  10.    Collecting users personal data yes yes yes yes 
  11.    Conducting legal projects yes yes yes yes 
  12.    Conducting electoral projects yes yes yes yes 
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Section 3.2 
ICT mobilization strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny during selected time          
framework 
 
Section 3.2.1 
ICT mobilization strategies during pre-electoral phase: March 18, 2016 -          
September 18, 2016 
 
Section 3.2.1.1 
ICT mobilization strategies common for Khodorkovsky and Navalny during         
pre-electoral phase 
 
In order to see degree to which different ICT mobilization strategies were used on              
website of both political actors, it is necessary to be able to assess them in relation to all                  
websites active during the pre-EP (pre-electoral period). They are listed in the Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2.​ Websites of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny used during March 18, 2016 - 
March 18, 2017, captured by the Wayback Machine 
* Alexa rank as of May 2017  
** subdomain 
 
Khodorkovsky 
Name URL Alexa traffic rank in RU 
Open Russia openrussia.org  
 
 
 
2,217 
Open Elections** vybory.openrussia.org  
ov.openrussia.org 
Legal Protection pravo.openrussia.org 
Open Russia Team or.team 345,041 
Khodorkovsky khodorkovsky.ru 42,497 
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Open University openuni.io 41,837 
Instead of Pution vmestoputina.ru 73,591 
Navalny 
Name URL Alexa traffic rank in RU 
Anti-Corruption Foundation fbk.info  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,086 
Letter to Chaika prokuror.fbk.info 
Municipal Clan petrograd.fbk.info 
Sochi - Map of Expenses petrograd.fbk.info 
Astronomic Salaries of State    
Officials 
money.fbk.info 
Against Withdrawal of   
Pension Assets 
pension.fbk.info 
People's Deputy deputat.fbk.info 
Navalny navalny.com  
 
280 Navalny 2018** 2018.navalny.com 
Illicit Enrichment 20.navalny.com 
Black Notebook blackbook.wiki 99,244 
RosYama rosyama.ru 30,679 
Rosvybory rosvybory.org 179,389 
RosZhKH roszkh.ru 29,542 
 
 
As it is indicated in the Table 1, During the pre-EP the following website-based ICT               
mobilization strategies were identified as common for two political leaders: 
● Countering hegemonic discourse 
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● Fostering deliberation online  
● Shaping idea of a political personality  
● News and media activities  
● Collecting users personal data  
● Recruiting  
● Conducting legal projects 
● Conducting electoral projects 
Contribution to the counter hegemonic discourse was a conspicuous element of main            
websites administered by Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Especially, website of his key project           
Open Russia - openrussia.org, and his personal website - khodorkovsky.ru. Websites of            
his side projects also were marked by this strategy, but to a different degree.  
Khodorkovsky websites were rich for the content on various aspects that fall into the              
agenda of this political actor and his projects. On the one hand, structural elements of               
websites served as channels for the discourse and as platforms used for its ongoing              
development. During the interview Representative of Khodorkovsky stated that for          
Open Russia website is a tool for delivering information to the masses and thus              
countering hegemonic discourse. Websites are also good for depositing information that           
allows users to find old materials easily. Though primary goal of Open Russia is offline               
activities, she confirmed that online allows organisation to reach higher scale in regard             
or audience. She also noted, that when the project was relaunched in 2014 it was at the                 
beginning intended only as information portal, but gradually it grew into the movement.  
In order to systematise delivered discourse and mark its signs, website elements had             
specific names, for example listed under tags. In principle, all website elements that             
contain any type of texts or discursive signs represented by other means can be              
considered as discursive. 
During the pre-EP, Open Russia website had a design different from the one that came               
in November 2016. The main page of the website contained summary boxes of the latest               
articles published in all sections. Such approach is designed to follow the natural flow              
of content. Traditionally, all summary boxes on this website consisted of cover images             
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and titles. Both of them are needed to deliver the message and invoke user's interest.               
Tags indicated under which topic a specific article was grouped.  
As it is stated in the List 1 (page 8), there is three different types of content, that served                   
for different aspects of counting hegemonic discourse:  
a) content prepared by political actors (ordered by websites administration) 
b) content prepared by users (approved by websites administration) 
c) content from other sources 
Two of three types of content were present on openrussia.org during pre-EP. Section             
titled 'Life' consisted of materials prepared under administration of the website - it had              
articles prepared by variety of authors (journalists, analysts, etc) for the Open Russia.             
Meanwhile, neighbouring section called ‘Community’ consisted of blogs of the          
registered users. Summary boxes in this section, in addition to standard elements,            
showed several lines of the respective texts. Curiously, for some articles it showed one              
first sentence, and for some - up to three first sentences. Thus some texts conveyed a                
message so important, that a user should have been able to read it without clicking on                
the link. In the lower area of the page a wide distinctive button inviting users ‘To create                 
an entry to blog’ was located. Blogging on the website was presented as an easy activity                
- that user was only one step from making contribution to the counter hegemonic              
discourse. 
Website of project Instead of Putin, that was launched on September 12, 2016 shortly              
before the Election Day, included short biographies of nominated experts and           
candidates, with number of 'pluses' given to a certain candidate indicated in the             
summary box of each entry.  
Elements of countering hegemonic discourse have also been identified in long term            
projects of Open Russia: Open University, Open Elections, Legal Protection; as well as             
some short term projects, like Open Lectures, Open Remark (2015), Letter to Prisoners             
(2014). Though these short term projects were active during past years, materials related             
to them were still available on the website and performed respective function. 
Educational project Open University changed its appearance once during pre-EP. WBM           
captured new design on June 26. Meanwhile, change in design have not given website              
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new functionality. Hegemonic discourse was countered there by means of civic           
education (​khodorkovsky.ru, 2016)​. Above the fold area of the website started with            
project description - ‘Video-lectures about modern Russia’. Video and textual materials           
were available on website without registration. The other long-term project, where           
content module played a significant part is ‘Legal Protection’. Website of this project             
told stories of political prisoners. Since they received help from Open Russia, there             
stories became part of general Open Russia narrative, which counters hegemonic           
discourse from multiple engles. In this case, by telling different stories of political             
prisoners, who represented in Russian hegemonic information space at least as           
controversial figures ( ​ren.tv, 2017).  
The core purpose of Khodorkovsky.ru - the personal website of Mikhail Khodorkovsky            
is covering ​his position on variety of issues, related to current political regime and              
developments in Russia, as well as Russia's relationship with outside world. Slider            
module MBKh vs. VVP (initials of Mikhail K and Vladimir Putin) is a good              
demonstration of activities targeted at countering hegemonic discourse. Usage of full           
surnames would sound to radical, but such a manner still sends a clear message.              
Naturally, this slider collected articles dedicated to K’s direct criticism against the            
president Putin. Algorithm put articles from any of the sections which contained root             
word ‘Putin’ to this slider. Conclusions about the special role, given to this slider can               
also be made by looking at more detailed structure of articles summary boxes. As any               
small summary box on this website, it consisted not only of cover image and a title, but                 
also of a concise description of the article type (e.g. interview, lecture, etc). Moreover,              
slider ‘MBKh vs. VVP’ had the most prominent image with K and Putin sitting              
vis-a-vis during some meeting. The image purposefully made degraded and colored in            
black and white to create certain subconscious impact on users. Contraposition of K to              
Putin can be seen not only from the website content, but also through such structural               
elements as the given slider. 
Further looking at the content of materials that were published on the website can reveal               
details of respective discourse, meanwhile it is a task for different research. 
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Websites administered by Alexei Navalny also were abundant with content during           
pre-EP, which should be considered in the framework of countering hegemonic           
discourse. The main website of Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) had a lot of            
materials on various aspects of Foundation activities. Though in the first half of the              
pre-EP, content from other sources was present on the main page of the website, starting               
from June 2016, the main page contained only summary boxes of original content of the               
website. With development of the project such usage of side sources was ceased. At the               
same time, content from other sources directly connected it to a broader oppositional             
narrative in Russia. 
Each section of the website was dedicated to different aspects of the Foundation             
activities, which had impact on structural organisation of the sections. Section           
'Investigations' consisted of textual and video content. Materials were presented under           
three types of summary boxes. One type was twice larger than the other two and               
consequently served a purpose of highlighting certain investigations and should lead           
users to click on them first. Section 'Public campaigns' had very similar design. It was               
dedicated to long term campaigns conducted by the Foundation. 
Section 'Surveys' ('Sociology')' consisted of surveys conducted by Foundation itself. By           
April 21, ACF conducted only 7 surveys. Summary boxes of each survey were plain -               
they contained only the title in large font and a short description. Absence of images or                
any other emotional markers tells about intention to present surveys data in impartial             
manner. Section 'Draft laws', dedicated to the draft laws against corruption developed            
by lawyers of the Foundation was designed in similar manner. 
Section 'Foundation' presented brief information about the foundation, its core activities           
and staff members. It had a slider bar with photos of demonstrating daily working              
process of the Foundation. The section had three sub-sections: About Foundation,           
Reports, and Navalny. Section was designed to demonstrate transparency for which the            
Foundation advocates. It contained reports for each year of the Foundation's work. They             
are located under respective subdomains and represent a chronological timeline of           
activities and achievements, supported by statistical data and visual aid. In addition,            
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short description of the Foundation (with its message and mission) in the right corner of               
the default footer. 
In the lower area of the main page and Investigations page one important element was               
located – a tag bar. It started with a hashtag sign and ten tags were highlighted in this                  
bar. It contained not only names of website sections, but also topics the most relevant on                
the website agenda at a given point in time. From perspective of discourse theory, they               
can be identified as signs, or even nodal points, for example ‘corruption' (Jørgensen,             
Phillips, 2002). During the pre-EP, up to ten topics were highlighted by this means, and               
9 of them stayed the same during this time. In general, tagging on this website was                
developed. Each article could have more than one tag (sign), which helped users to              
navigate in this discourse. 
Elements of counter-hegemonic discourse were identified in all websites of Foundation           
projects: 'Illicit Enrichment' (20.navalny.com), Black notebook (blackbook.wiki), Sochi:        
Encyclopedia of Expenses (sochi.fbk.info), Campaign against withdrawal of pension         
assets (pension.fbk.info) and Municipal clan (petrograd.fbk.info). Nature of websites         
structure varied through these projects and was affected by their purposes. The main             
page of the website 'Illicit Enrichment' (20.navalny.com) stated the mission of the            
campaign. It advocated for ratification of the Article 20 of United Nations Convention             
against Corruption. Through it was not visible on the archived version of the website,              
evidence of presence of interactive module of State Duma Seats was identified in the              
HTML code of the Deputies section (class="seatingChartSection"). This module in          
interactive manner demonstrates correlation between deputies who expressed their         
positive opinion about the ‘Article 20’ and those who refrained from comments            
regarding the ratification of Article 20 seats in the Duma. Here counter hegemonic             
discourse was delivered rather in a visual form than in textual one. Other websites also               
were marked by creative usage of visual elements, which have stronger impact on users              
(Isenberg et al, 2013). Two more websites had visual as a primary form of countering               
hegemonic discourse. Website sochi.fbk.info provided a comprehensive report on true          
expanses and evidence of non-targeted usage of budget funds (fbk.info, 2017). Though            
it is not visible on archived versions, HTML code of an up to date website corresponds                
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to the code of archived one. Website petrograd.fbk.info ‘Municipal clan' demonstrated           
results of detailed investigation about the nepotism and corruption in Saint-Petersburg           
municipality. As well as interactive module of State Duma Seats from the project Illicit              
Enrichment, layout of Saint-Petersburg Municipality served as starting point, that          
allowed website to demonstrate in a visual form interconnections between different           
municipal deputies. 
Meanwhile, countering hegemonic discourse was conducted within the public campaign          
against withdrawal of pension assets (pension.fbk.info) in a textual form. A website            
offered users an option to send email to deputies that voted for the criticized law. A                
letter had five templates, which reflected the level of users irritation. Such practice of              
offering users ready text that attempt to reflect their opinions was used in other projects               
of Alexei Navalny, which are addressed later. 
Blog of Alexei Navalny consisted of posts on wide range of issues that invoke interest               
of the political actor, or related to his activities. Default header had links to three               
featured posts. Sidebar had text links to up to ten of them of articles displayed in                
chronological order. For further navigation through posts, the side bar had a calendar.             
Facilitated navigation through the blog also means easier navigation through the           
discourse. 
The website of the Party of Progress had a traditional structure and contained elements              
of this strategy predominantly through the content. Main page had description of parties             
mission and target audience and a module with latest news about party activities and              
developments. Summary boxes in the mews module were marked with discrepancy in            
representation of different articles. For some articles, it displayed one first sentence, and             
for other - three. Such approach was previously noted for websites of Mikhail             
Khodorkovsky. 
In order to expand audience that would be engaged in the discourse produced by              
websites of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny, two important dissemination          
tools - email and social media - were also applied. 
Meanwhile, modules to subscription via email were scarcely present through the           
projects of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In particular, it was present on openrussia.org,           
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pravo.openrussia.org, openuni.io and vmestoputina.ru. Usually, email subscription       
module was located in the default footer area (default footer is a unified footer present               
in all webpages of a website). Website of main project Open Russia had a subscription               
module in the middle of above the fold are of the main page. Above the fold is a                  
‘newspaper term appropriated for online use, with the ‘fold’ being where the paper gets              
folded in half. Thus ‘above the fold’ indicates the information that is immediately             
displayed within the browser window’ when a user loads a website (Frank, 2003: 3).              
Frank suggest that ‘the most important links and content’ should be placed in the above               
the fold area and this statement is conventionally accepted in the web development.             
According to Alexa rank, openrussia.org has the highest rank among Open Russia            
websites and it is logical that subscription module is given such attention in the main               
website of the political actor (see Table 2). 
Regarding Alexei Navalny, email subscription was present on website of          
Anti-Corruption Foundation and its projects to a much higher degree. Website of            
Anti-Corruption Foundation had a wide module with a subscribe message, field for            
email and a red button ‘Subscribe’. This module was located on webpage of every              
section of the website and on Public campaigns and projects: 'Illicit Enrichment', 'Sochi             
- Expanses map', 'Against illegal advertisement in entrances', Rosvybory (on the landing            
page subscription to general updates from the foundation.) Such attention to           
subscription could be explained by understanding from Alexei Navalny team that users            
may not visit website on a regular basis, but if the subscribe - they will receive carefully                 
selected portion of information. Whether user tend to read such messages is a further              
question to ask. On the blog, subscribe button with a message could be found in the                
right side bar and in the section 'About Navalny'. One remarkable feature of email              
subscription on Navalny’s project is the fact that ‘Subscribe’ buttons were often            
supported by a message that motivated users for respective action. 
Spreading of counter hegemonic discourse was supported via other, even more powerful            
channel – social media. Though this strategy is implemented on social media under             
different terms, it was connected to the website. In general, websites serve as a              
gravitation point for all the ICT mobilization activities and their target audiences. 
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Social media buttons send users to respective social media pages, where users can opt to               
‘follow’ or ‘like’ a page. They also were identified on Khodorkovsky and Navalny             
websites. While, on openrussia.org they were located in the footer area, on            
khodorkovsky.ru - in the right corner of default header (default header is a unified              
header present in all webpages of a website). On Open Russia website, social media              
buttons were supported by Facebook and Vkontakte widgets in the footer area of every              
section. Widgets show number of subscribers and thus can give more incentive to users              
to ‘like’ respective pages (Fisher, 2009). The interviewee stated that currently           
Khodorkovsky's organisation puts increasingly more emphasis on social media as a tool            
of mobilization. 
Regarding Navalny’s platforms, social media buttons (Twitter and Facebook) were          
included to the default footer. At the same time, the main page of fbk.info, had buttons                
to Vkontakte, Facebook, Twitter and Odnoklasniki in its lower area. The main page is a               
first frontier in website-user interaction and stimuli put on this page have a strong              
impact on users (Deng and Poole, 2010). 
Social media buttons on the blog of Alexei Navalny were located in the right corner of                
default header: Facebook, Vkontakte, Odnoklasniki, Twitter and Instagram. In addition,          
it had special text link 'Navalny in Twitter' under all elements of the sidebar and in the                 
section 'About Navalny'. This tells about importance of Twitter as a channel for             
conveying message to users and engaging them into the discussion. This attention given             
to Twitter was common for both political leader. Meanwhile, Navalny had one unique             
feature that falls under simplifying potential of the website in reaching audience - a              
button to switch on push notifications for the browser. 
Strategy of countering hegemonic discourse is intrinsically related to the next strategy -             
deliberation of users online. As was noted in the theoretical section, discourse is an              
articulatory practice. The purpose of political leaders who take deliberation online           
seriously is not only to convey discourse, but also to foster its constant development by               
means of users communication. 
During pre-EP Mikhail Khodorkovsky paid due attention to this matter. According to            
the interviewee, the value of websites and social media to the organisation is in their               
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power of two-way interaction. Naturally commenting section were provided under          
materials published on websites. Openrusia.org and Khodorkovsky.ru had a         
commenting section under every published material; Instead of Putin had it under every             
nominated 'candidate' page. In order to reflect on activity of discussion, a number of              
comments was indicated on articles summary boxes, presented in respective sections of            
the website. Further research could look if logical assumption that users are more             
inclined to visit materials with higher numbers of comments is true. 
In majority of cases authors do not engage in users discussion that unfolds in              
commenting section and this statement applies to websites addressed above.          
Meanwhile, evidence indicated that on the website vmestoputina.ru some experts that           
nominated candidates were involved in discussion in the commenting section. 
Deliberation online is possible not only via commenting. Open Russia had a special             
plug-in called ‘Ask a question’. Here a user could post a question and other users could                
give answers to them. Discussion in such format is more focused and formalized. 
Though this research predominantly addresses presence of certain strategies on          
websites, sometime absence of such strategies can invoke useful assumptions. While           
website of Open University was marked by countering hegemonic discourse, it had no             
function of deliberation online. It can be interpreted as intention to keep conveyed             
information pure from admixtures and follow a classical format of educational lectures            
with one-way type of interaction. This is also true about website of the project Legal               
Protection, where no evidence of commenting feature was identified. 
Deliberation online was also scarcely presented on website of Alexei Navalny. Only his             
blog Navalny.com had a commenting section under every post. Meanwhile, deliberation           
online is possible not only on websites, but also on social media. Moreover, social              
media is naturally more auspicious platform for this strategy (Halpern, Gibbs, 2013).            
Presence of ‘Share’ social media buttons is a gateway to deliberation online, which is              
conducted on the different platform, but invoked by website content. Such ‘Share’            
buttons were identified on websites of public campaigns of the Anti-Corruption           
Foundation: in all except for RosYama and Sochi - Expenses Encyclopedia (here no             
evidence could be identified); Navalny.com and partyprogress.org (Party of Progress). 
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Websites give political leaders an advantage of control over the content and flow of              
information, while on social media, posted contend quickly gets new interpretations           
with help of ongoing discussions, and moderation is often not a simple solution. It was               
already demonstrated how two political leaders used their websites for countering           
hegemonic discourse. A strategy of shaping idea of political personality can be also             
considered as a discursive activity. From perspectives of a political leader, shaping idea             
of him or her as political personalities should be a pillar element of counter hegemonic               
discursive structure (Howarth, 2010: 311). Though ultimate political objectives of          
political leaders might not be that obvious at the first glance, complex of their ICT               
mobilization strategies serves this purpose. Connection between mobilization strategies         
and political objective is more clear in case of personalized oppositional movement.            
Leaders of such personalized oppositional movements are inclined to pursue state           
bodies directly. The movement lead by Alexei Navalny is a good example. Meanwhile             
Mikhail Khodorkovsky increasingly aims at depersonalization of Open Russia and          
perseus Russian politics indirectly. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky has a personal website khodorkovsky.ru. During pre-EP it had           
sections All materials, MBKh, Daily, Statements, Media, Events, Biography, Yukos          
case. They were dedicated to covering selected aspects of his political personality.            
Summary boxes of majority of materials published in the website were generously            
supported by images of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The main page had a large box with a               
featured article. The same article could stay featured for many days. For example,             
article 'Putin's regime is not eternal' was featured for at least 31 day according to the                
archived version from the WBM. During the pre-EP two statements and one event were              
featured in this manner. When a content element stays static for such a significant              
amount of time virtually it comes close to crossing the line of becoming an element of                
website structure. 
Above the fold area also had a large plug-in with latest messages from Twitter account               
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. According the web page HTML code, a standard Twitter            
widget was used for this website. With first loading such plug-in allows user to scroll               
through latest 20 tweets and then suggests to load more tweets without leaving the              
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website. In this case, social media is used for two way generation of content. On the one                 
hand, social media buttons allow users to post content from the website on their social               
media account. While on the other hand, posts from social media are added to the               
website in the form a fully fledged content. Former instance is much more common in               
the framework of website - social media interrelation. 
Website had another important element used for shaping idea of the political personality             
- slider modules (a special modules, also referred as carousel that allow users to scroll               
through selected content horizontally). ​They are designed to provide additional          
coverage for certain content. With help of this instrument, Khodorkovsky informed           
users on core framework of his position. While Goffman focuses on the role of frames               
in social perception of situations or phenomena, this term can be applied to the process               
of deliberate creation of an imprecision among users (​Goffman, 1974)​. The message            
that Khodorkovsky is in contraption to Putin is this king of frame. Within slider              
modules position of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was presented via four slider modules, that            
focus on different means by which this political actor delivers his message: Program             
articles, MBKh vs. VVP (initials of Mikhail K and Vladimir Putin), Key speeches and              
Significant Interviews.  
Module ‘Biography of Khodorkovsky’ came in the lower area of the webpage.            
Respective webpage had nine buttons, which corresponded to ‘chapters’ of the           
biography. This section gave a ‘humane face’ to the political personality. Final module             
of the main page was called ‘Around YUKOS case’. Apparently, this chapter of the              
biography had high significance that it required such attention. Thus, users would            
familiarise with the case even without making a decision to read through            
Khodorkovsky's biography.  
Alexei Navalny’s blog navalny.com performed the function of being his personal           
website. It also had a section that provided a biography of the oppositional leader. It was                
called 'About Navalny - Biography, family, activities'. Webpage contained a short           
default message that Alexei Navalny is a 'head of Party of Progress, founder of              
Anti-Corruption Foundation, son, husband, father.' A large photo of Navalny with his            
family was followed by links to his biography, interviews and statements from various             
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sources. Meanwhile, how biography was presented distinguishes navalny.com from         
khodorkovsky.ru. While later had an article covering his biography, former used links to             
other sources that had information about him. In this manner Navalny let users to judge               
about his personality based on what was told about him or by him outside of his                
personal website. 
Following depersonalization tendency, website of Open Russia did not have a special            
section dedicated to Khodorkovsky, meanwhile according to advanced google search,          
Khodorkovsky was mentioned on the website in 92 webpages during the pre-EP. At the              
same time, evidence of the personalization of Alexei Navalny movement was confirmed            
during analysis of other websites apart for his blog. Website of Party of progress also               
had short biography of the political actor in the ‘About party’ section. It highlighted key               
points in his life and career relevant from perspective of the party). At the same time,                
website of Anti-Corruption Foundation had a section 'Foundation' and in the module            
dedicated to staff, had a button with photo of Alexei Navalny and indication of his               
position - 'Founder of the Foundation'. According to URL (Uniform Resource Locator),            
a button lead to search result on 'Alexei Navalny', which in its turn showed website               
content were he was mentioned. Thus, on the given three major platforms, shaping idea              
of Alexei Navalny came in a multifacet form, which should have had a complex impact               
on users. In addition, Navalny's name was included in the footer of every ACF project               
or public campaign. It demonstrated fundamental link between him and activities of            
foundation. As well as, made websites of his projects to show in search engines after               
search request for ‘Navalny’. 
Oppositional political leaders operate in broad information space. Respective coverage          
of their activities and activities in their projects is as important as introduction of              
information from outside world into the websites. Websites of both Khodorkovsky and            
Navalny were involved in coverage of developments in the form of news or more              
general news-oriented content. Though this strategy logically should undergo to the           
strategy of countering hegemonic discourse, it was delineated into separate for two            
reasons. First, separate sections dedicated to the given strategy were identified on            
websites of Khodorkovsky and Navalny. Second, their approach to this strategy differed            
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significantly at some point of time and this difference is important in terms of impact of                
location. 
Websites elements that fall under strategy ‘News and media activities’ can be grouped             
under two subcategories: a) news specifically about projects and b) general news about             
socio-political developments. 
During pre-EP, Khodorkovsky's openrussia.org had a section News that contained          
materials about developments in Open Russia projects. According to the interviewee,           
this section was needed because users prefer to read about relevant and up to date               
developments.  
For Navalny’s fbk.info, project developments were covered in the section          
‘Investigations’, since it was the major activity of the Foundation that can be covered on               
daily basis. Apart from original content, news in this section also included selected             
feedback or additional information from other sources. The same is true about news             
section on the Party of progress.  
Meanwhile, the section ‘Life’ on the openrussia.org had topical subsections oriented on            
general socio-political developments. They were listed in the lower area of the section.             
In particular, ‘About Russia’ was dedicated to presentation of publications in foreign            
media about Russia; subsections ‘Persecution’ and ‘Process’ - to politically motivated           
or unlawful cases of persecution and ongoing legal processes; club 'Open Russia' -             
covered discussions conducted in the club; 'Direct speech' - direct statements of both             
oppositional and governmental political actors. According to old version of the ‘Open            
Elections’, it had news section with two subsections: 'We did' and 'Candidates did'. First              
one was focused on the achievements of the project itself, and second one - on               
achievement of candidates supported in framework of the project. Personal website of            
Khodorkovsky also had news oriented topical sections: MBKh Daily, Media, Events,           
Statements, about Yukos. In addition, it had a slider module ‘Latest news'.  
Website of Navalny’s public campaign Illicit enrichment had a module dedicated to            
'News' in the above fold area of the main page. Highlighted news were related to               
developments of the campaign, in the foundation (related to the campaign) and people,             
targeted by the campaign. Nature of the ACF campaign Black Notebook required            
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coverage of news that transcend developments in Navalny’s project. For a selected            
personality included to the ‘Notebook’, each unlawful episode was presented as a piece             
of news. Each entry consisted of date; substance of episode and source of information              
(e.g media). Episodes were added on a rolling basis. Though blog of Alexei Navalny did               
not have a specific section dedicated to news, by its means political actor covered a               
wide range of issues, which included both general socio-political developments as well            
as developments in his multiple projects. The blog serviced as a point of attraction for               
all the activities of Alexei Navalny. It is actively used both as an information              
dissemination tool and as instrument of mobilization. Success of his blog was already             
noted in 2013 ( ​Bode and Makarychev, 2013). 
Though both political actor were involved in coverage or introduction of news beyond             
their projects, projects of Alexei Navalny were involved in this more loosely. As well as               
Khodorkovsky, he was seeking to connect his activities and agenda to selected aspects             
of broader information space, but direct link to other sources was not considered             
inappropriate. 
Recruiting is one of the traditional mobilization strategies, which took more structured            
form with the help of ICT. Both political actors were actively recruiting during pre-EP,              
but they were targeting their efforts on two different categories of supporters. In             
majority cases, Mikhail Khodorkovsky would recruit activists, while Alexei Navalny          
was recruiting volunteers.  
Since Mikhail Khodorkovsky recruitment was targeted at activists, it was conducted on            
specifically tailored platforms. According to interview conducted with the         
representative of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in framework of his ICT mobilization          
strategies, websites do a better job in recruiting than social media (which in this case               
rather serves a promotion tool). She said that websites help Khodorkovsky to recruit             
members of the movement, trainings participants, content contributors, etc. 
The most high profile recruiting was done via website Instead of Putin. This project is               
aimed at creating alternatives to Vladimir Putin for the next presidential elections in             
2018 (Open Russia, 2016). Website ‘Instead of Putin’ contained a registration form,            
which indicated that by registering users can propose themselves as candidates. During            
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pre-EP the other electoral project Open Elections allowed candidates to apply for            
support for their campaigns during Parliamentary Elections 2016. In addition, this           
project also was seeking volunteers. It had a 'Join' module with two buttons: 'Become a               
candidate' and 'Become a volunteer'. Though humanitarian project Legal Protection was           
not presented as political one, application of activists for legal support can be             
considered as a form of recruiting. Such support had a potential to create stronger bond               
between defendants supported by Khodorkovsky organisation, which in its turn could           
give higher level of loyalty assuming positive outcome of received support. 
Operating inside the country Alexei Navalny conducted very active recruiting of           
volunteers during the pre-EP. Default footer of the Anti-Corruption Foundation website           
had a button 'Volunteers', clicking on it lead to a separate webpage section. This section               
had a tailored message and a detailed registration form for each of three categories:              
Design, Survey and Content. Though the form was tailored for each category, it the              
following default fields: name and surname, phone number and email. In such a             
manner, category Design had additional fields: portfolio and about yourself; category           
Surveys - city, and several fields that asked users about their preferences for conducting              
surveys; category Content - links to social media, 'what you are proud of', and about               
yourself. By this means users would provide very detailed information about themselves            
that would help the team of political actor to profile them properly and identify a               
respective approach to these people. Here diversification and tailoring of volunteering           
activities was done already on the initial stage of recruiting. Recruiting on the website              
of the campaign Illicit Enrichment was done on the same manner. Main page had a               
button 'Become a volunteer’ in lower right corner of the main age. Following practice of               
the main website of the foundation, clicking on the button also lead to a separate               
webpage, which started with a message 'Help the campaign, become a volunteer!' and a              
short description of what volunteers could do for the campaign. Then followed three             
different buttons with a short description of nature of tasks: 'I want to help online',               
'Professional help, and 'I want to help offline'. Clicking on the button 'Professional help'              
lead to 'email to' module. This module prompted users to write campaign an email and               
tell what kind of professional help they were interested in. Clicking on the other two               
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buttons lead to popup windows contents of which were not visible in archived versions.              
Than followed a module on a contrast background - 'Become a volunteer in your city'.               
The message under title stated 'Give your contact details and we will contact you to tell                
how you can help the campaign'. After filling in the form a user would have to press a                  
large red button stating 'I enroll'. The rest of the page dedicated to the matter, contained                
multiple photos that demonstrated work of volunteers for the campaign. Hovering over            
each picture revealed a text that explained the kind of activity and its participants. This               
evidence demonstrates well developed recruiting mechanism with carefully tailored         
messages and names given to modules. In particularly, the fact that ‘volunteer’ buttons             
were named from the first person. Finally, though Party of Progress has a significant              
connection to Alexei Navalny, recruiting of volunteers on its website during pre-EP was             
much less developed. The website had a section 'Help party' with a link to a separate                
webpage. This page did not have motivational messages and respective button instead            
of saying ‘I volunteer’ stated ‘Submit’. 
Collection of users personal data is a fundamental ICT strategy for political actors. It is               
connected to recruiting, because for successful recruiting leaders also have to collect            
data. Collecting of user personal data can be done for wide range of reasons that               
transcend recruiting. 
Personal data is a powerful tool in hands of political leaders. Diverse and             
comprehensive data allows them to optimize targeting of their mobilization efforts.           
Collected personal data is usually processed by back-end ICT mobilization tools, like            
CRM (customer or constituency management systems). On the front-end websites serve           
as platforms where users provide their personal data for conducting online or offline             
activities. During pre-EP collection of users personal data on Khodorkovsky websites           
was done predominantly for online activities, while in the case of Navalny it was the               
other way round.  
The primary form of collection users personal data is their registration that performs             
role of the gate to a website and a first step before conducting online activity. In order to                  
start a blog and for commenting on Open Russia, a user had to register an account or                 
sign in via social media. On the website Instead of Putin, registration was required for               
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conducting any kind of online activity: vote, comment, nominate someone or yourself            
as a candidate. Nomination and self-nomination as candidate gave Mikhail          
Khodorkovsky data about highly profiled supporters or potential partners, which would           
require respective approach on offline level. On Khodorkovsky.ru is a user wanted to             
engage in online discussion he or she had to sign in via a social media account. On                 
Open University registration allowed users to track their study progress.  
Since deliberation online was underdeveloped strategy on website of Alexei Navalny,           
registration was required only on his blog. Though archived versions of the website do              
not have evidence that it required registration for commenting, it can be logically             
concluded because posts published during pre-EP contain comments provided at          
respective time. The other forms of registration for online activities were identified on             
websites that were designed for collection of complaints from population. On the            
website of the RosYama project, in order to add a pothole to the system a user had to                  
sign in via social media or to an account on the website. Though archived version does                
not display website structure, analysis of a webpages HTML codes provided evidence            
that the same code segment corresponds to the button 'add a pothole' on the up to date                 
website. On the RosZhKH website, if a user already submitted compliant via this             
service, it was possible to sign in to avoid repeated entry of data.  
Regarding registration for offline activities Khodorkovsky websites had little instances.          
On Open Elections website registration was necessary if a user wanted to become a              
volunteer or a candidate; on website of Legal Protection no registration was required,             
but users had to provide their email address if they wanted to apply for help. At the                 
same time abundant evidence of registration for offline activities was identified on            
websites of Alexei Navalny. Forms on most of the websites required filling in the              
following fields: name and surname, phone and email. 
First of all, Navalny was actively recruiting volunteers, which in more detailed was             
addressed earlier. Fbk.info had a detailed form for registration for volunteering, which            
had standard fields mentioned above. The form had sections for different activities for             
which a user could volunteer: design, surveys and content. In addition to standard fields              
section also had a field 'City'. Website of Party of Progress had a section 'Help party',                
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which provided a link to the form where a user could sign up as a volunteer for the                  
Democratic coalition. It is not clear whether Navalny had access to provided data, since              
Democratic Coalition website was not administered by him.  
The website of campaign ‘Illicit enrichment’ had a special webpage 'Become a            
volunteer'. It also was diversified based on the type of activity. Module 'Become a              
volunteer in your city' also had an additional field ‘city’. Due to nature of this campaign,                
its website also had a webpage 'Declarations', which in its turn had a button 'I want to                 
send this letter'. Clicking on it revealed a popup form with standard field. In the other                
campaign ‘Letter to Chaika’ users could also send a letter. Due to the fact that a letter                 
would be sent via regular mail service, a user had to provide more detailed data: name,                
patronymic and surname; email, country, mail index and address of residence. Website            
of the campaign RosZhKH also required filling in as detailed form if a user wanted to                
submit complaint on utility service. Such a detailed personal data is especially useful for              
political actors and it can be argued that this strategy was one of reasons for conducting                
these campaigns. At the same time, users also could give a tangible gain for giving up                
such personal data. On the website of ‘People's deputy’ if a user wanted to put a                
signature under the draft law it was necessary to fill in a form with standard fields.  
As we can see, collection of users personal data ranged from fast sign in via social                
media for the most simple activities to providing a very detailed data for engaging in               
more complex activities. Details of Khodorkovsky and especially Navalny ICT          
mobilization strategy of collecting users personal data, revealed that users can provide            
their data for a variety of online and offline activities. Not only the data provided by                
users gives valuable information to political actors but also specific activity that induced             
them to provide it (e.g., submitting a complaint or applying for support as an electoral               
candidate). The data gives political actors power to understand the pool of their             
supporters, and who has to be targeted to become a potential supporter.  
In general, collecting users personal data reminds a transaction in which each side             
exchanges something valuable: user provides personal data and agrees on its processing            
in exchange to conduct a desirable online or offline activity. 
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Both Khodorkovsky share criticism of the legal system in Russia and attempt to             
improve it or tackle its disadvantages in certain way. During pre-EP Mikhail            
Khodorkovsky legal activities were concentrated in the Open Russian project Legal           
Protection. Digital form of this program had a clear and simple structure. Apart from              
countering hegemonic discourse conducted via the module with cases included into the            
program, website also had an application module which allowed users to apply for legal              
help from the project.  
At the same time, Alexei Navalny was involved in diversified legal activities, which             
also included legislative initiatives. Website of Anti Corruption Foundation had a           
Section 'Draft laws' dedicated to the draft laws against corruption prepared by lawyers             
of the Foundation. By April 21, 2016 7 draft laws were published on the website.               
Foundation’s public campaign ‘Illicit Enrichment’ was advocating for ratification of the           
Article 20 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and introduction of            
criminal responsibility for corruption. A website which relied on power of visualization            
was called ‘Astronomic Salaries of State Officials’. It was demonstrating how much            
money one of the richest oligarchs in the country made while ‘a user was sitting on this                 
website’. It had a button 'How to end this', which lead to a pop up window. The                 
window contained a referral to the draft law 'Illicit enrichment'. At the same time,              
website ‘People's deputy’ had a box on main page with a referral to the draft law                
'Regulation of tariffs for utility services'. The goal of campaign was to collect signatures              
to obtain the right of legislative initiative. In this manner legislative initiatives were             
supported by public campaigns that delivered meaning of addressed issues in           
understandable form. In order to amplify effect, this ICT mobilization strategy was            
promoted via the blog of Alexei Navalny. 
Since both political actors were participating in the Parliamentary Elections in one or             
another way, they both had electoral projects with respective websites. Electoral           
projects is a complex activity. For both political actors it comprised multiple            
website-based ICT mobilization strategies addressed earlier in the text. Regarding          
Mikhail Khodorkovsky project, in addition to other strategies, Open Russia website had            
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a button 'Support a candidate' in the footer area of the main page. It lead to a donate                  
landing page of the project Open Elections.  
Alexei Navalny also had some election-oriented projects. It is logical to assume that the              
project Rosvybory would be as active during Parliamentary Elections 2016, as it was             
during Navalny’s Mayoral campaign 2013. Meanwhile, during the pre-EP website had           
only one page, stating ‘that there are no elections yet, and that is why it is suspended'. In                  
fact, from April 2014 the website had only a landing page. Such state of affairs indicates                
that the project was designed only for elections in which Alexei Navalny participates             
directly. As it can be seen in the Table 1 electoral projects can have other incarnations,                
apart from those, which involve support to candidates (Table 1, page 23). Section             
'Sociology’ on the website of Anti Corruption foundation can be interpreted in such a              
manner. Though there are no archived versions available for the period between April             
and November, materials published on the website during this time can be identified on              
the current version of the website. Foundation published results of three pre-electoral            
surveys on the website. Electoral campaigning requires holistic approach and political           
actors need to be resourceful if they want to win potential electorate. Needless to say,               
that Alexei Navalny used his blog in order to advance his agenda regarding             
Parliamentary elections 2016. 
As analysis presented in the given section demonstrated, website-based ICT          
mobilization strategies identified as common for Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei          
Navalny were applied by these actors to a different degree and in a different forms.               
Significant divergence was observed in regard of the rest of strategies - three out of               
eleven (one strategy was not used by any actor during pre-EP) were identified unique              
for Alexei Navalny. At the same time, no evidence was identified that Mikhail             
Khodorkovsky also was involved in certain additional website-based ICT mobilization          
strategies during pre-EP.  
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Section 3.2.1.2 
ICT mobilization strategies unique to Navalny during pre-electoral phase 
 
In his multidimensional crusade against corruption, Alexei Navalny paid attention to           
multiple aspects of tackling this issue and demonstrated a complex approach. Though            
website-based ICT mobilization strategies addressed above are indeed important in the           
framework of Navalny’s anti-corruption activities, three unique strategies were pillar to           
his pursuit in this matter.  
In order to convince people that corruption is not an abstract entity, Navalny put an               
effort to demonstrate that it has tangible consequences to the society and the country. It               
was done with help of two interrelated strategies. On the one hand, he was exposing               
perpetrations and on the other hand - exposing and addressing issues related population             
well-being (and caused by corruption). The following examination demonstrates that          
application of these two tools of exposure has potential to lead to synergetic effect. 
Investigation of the instances of corruption is the main activity of Anti Corruption             
Foundation. In order to influence opinion of potential supporters, results of these            
investigations have to be presented in a respective manner. In other words - corruption              
had to be exposed in its most notorious form. The following examination demonstrates             
that Navalny relied significantly on the power of visualization in this process. During             
pre-EP, results of investigation of corruption were published on the website in section             
'Investigations'. Often extensive textual materials were supported with images and          
videos, which represented evidences gathered during investigative process. Though no          
archived versions of specific investigations webpages are available on WMB, this           
conclusion can be made based on analysis of articles published on the website during              
pre-EP and available via up to date website. In the process of exposure Alexei              
Navalny’s Youtube channel served as platform for publishing videos with results of            
investigations. It became intrinsic element of his activities that transcended issue of            
corruption. As a matter of a fact, Navalny’s channel is a platform for all video materials                
published within his activities. 
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Examination of other websites of Alexei Navalny demonstrates that perpetrations          
exposure can have variety of other forms. Each of the projects below had its own               
manner of perpetrations exposure. It was defined by nature of projects and aspects of              
perpetrations targeted by them. 
The platform Black Notebook - had a website that represented database of state officials              
involved in unlawful actions. Database looked like a list of individuals in an             
alphabetical order. Module of each deputy had his or her photo, name and position. It               
also had a red button, which indicated a number of episodes of unlawful actions.              
Clicking on a button revealed a list of episodes. For each episode it had fields: date;                
substance of episode; source of information (e.g media); person who can confirm the             
fact of episode; material (links to other sources) and tags.  
Website of the campaign Municipal Clan had a single webpage that was dedicated to              
results of detailed investigation about the nepotism and corruption in ST.Petersburg           
municipality. The main module had a list of all members of St.Petersburg Legislative             
assembly. By gradual scrolling it revealed nepotism, corrupt connections and unlawful           
actions of members of the assembly. Around half of names were presented as text links,               
clicking on which revealed a popup window with details of perpetuations conducted by             
a specific individual.  
The website ‘Sochi - encyclopedia of expenses’ was designed in order to visually             
demonstrate 'comprehensive report on true expanses and evidence of non-targeted usage           
of budget funds' during preparation of Sochi Olympics 2014. It represented a map. It              
had each relevant object of the sport complex involved in perpetration. Clicking on the              
button of an object revealed a popup window with details of a specific objects, as well                
as people involved in perpetuations related to them. Though it is not visible on archived               
versions, HTML code of the up to date website corresponds to the code of archived one. 
The campaign Astronomic Salaries of State Officials also represented the single           
webpage designed to demonstrate how much money the following state officials made:            
Igor Sechin, Igor Kostin, Vladimir Yakunin. It had boxes with information about their             
yearly salaries and a counter under each name. A message states ' this is how much                
money they made, while you are sitting on this website'. 
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Website of the campaign Against withdrawal of pension assets had a header which             
stated that a specific deputy voted for the law on withdrawal of pension assets for 2014                
(​Государственная Дума, 2013) ​. The module with information about certain deputy had           
a text field with details about this deputy, a photo, and a drop down menu, which                
allowed a user to choose deputies from different cities. Then come a calculator, which              
demonstrated ration between personal income inserted by user and amount of money,            
lost due to the law. Moreover, the lost amount was visualised with help of image of                
some item (e.g. IPhones, lipsticks, roses). Individually targeted exposure of perpetrators           
became an intrinsic feature of Navalny activities. 
Evidence found on the websites Illicit Enrichment and RosYama fall under two            
interrelated mobilization strategies: exposing perpetrations on the one hand, and          
exposing and addressing issues with population well-being on the other.  
Website of the campaign Illicit enrichment had a section 'Declarations'. It showed which             
deputies of regional legislative organs concealed their declarations. A module had a            
name and photo of a selected deputy and button with years from 2012 to 2014. If text                 
link was in red color it meant that deputy had not published his or her declaration. By                 
these means perpetrations exposure was conducted. Meanwhile website allowed user to           
address this issue in the following way. The section also had a tool which allowed users                
to request a specific deputy to publish the declaration. Respective module had a name              
'Request publication of a declaration'. Than followed a box with text of official request              
and a red button 'I want to send this letter'. This tool not only showed deputies, who                 
allegedly had something to hide, but also let users to pressure them by means of ICT.  
This website had another section designed for exposure. It was called 'Map of country              
houses' and represented a 'public encyclopedia of estate that belongs to Russian state             
officials’ (20.navalny.com on WMB, 2016). Apart from estates added by foundation           
itself, users also could add new entries. Some entries contained photos of specific             
country houses. Especially the most luxurious ones. The section showed which state            
official had real estate that they could not efford unless involved in corruption, and              
allowed users to address this issue. 
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Evidence from the the website of the ACF’s project RosYama (Russian pothole) can             
also be interpreted in the framework of both website-based mobilization strategies. The            
website contained photos of potholes, submitted by users. Though archived version does            
not display website structure, analysis of a webpages HTML codes provided evidence            
that the same code segment corresponds to the module 'Recent victories' on the up to               
date website. In addition, summary box of the project on the main ACF website stated               
how many potholes were fixed since launch of the project. In such a manner Foundation               
demonstrated the impact of their efforts. Here potholes symbolize negative          
consequences for the people caused by corruption, and they play well in contrast with              
‘positive’ consequence that corrupt officials enjoy.  
Navalny website also had element design predominantly for exposing and addressing           
issues with population well-being. In principle, this strategy looks on the other side of              
corruption. According to Navalny’s position, corruption is a core cause of issues related             
to population wellbeing.  
Website of the campaign Letter to Chaika represented a platform that let users to              
demand accountability from the Prosecutor General Juri Chaika regarding perpetuations          
exposed via investigation conducted by the Foundation. The module with field for            
personal data had boxes, by ticking which users could indicate where the letter should              
be sent: to the president, to Channel One Russia, or to Investigative Committee. Each              
box had a short description of the obligations that each institution had in relation to the                
perpetrations exposed by means of this investigation. 
Campaign Against Illegal Advertisement in Entrances had a website that served as a             
platform, where users could submit a claim about illegal advertisement in entrance of             
specific houses. Complaint form contained the following fields: address; place with           
advertisement; name of advertising company; name of a managing company. Wide           
interactive module depicted entrance covered with untidy advertisements. Hovering         
over a large red button 'Get rid of' made them disappear and entrance wound became               
clean. Visual demonstration of how easy it is to get rid of illegal advertisements - a user                 
just needs to follow instructions on the website. 
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Website of the campaign Against Withdrawal of Pension Assets apart from modules for             
perpetrations exposure had a module 'Send a letter to the deputy'. Short description             
stated that a letter will be sent via State Duma website and will require official reply. It                 
had five drafts of letters, which reflected level of users indignation. Then followed a              
button 'I want to send this letter'.  
Website of the ACF project RosZhKH was designed for users to submit complaints on              
utility services. A user had to choose type of a utility service issue and then fill in a                  
detailed form. In order to demonstrate impact of the campaign, summary box of the              
project link on the main ACF website stated how many bulbs were replaced in 2014. 
The third strategy that was identified as unique to projects of Alexei Navalny in pre-EP               
is fundraising. Fundraising is an important strategy for all political actors and it is              
imperative for those who are limited in financial resources. Meanwhile, even political            
leaders who do not have problems with funding still have to engage in raising              
microdonations from population, because the greatest value of them lays beyond           
financial gain. With donation individuals not only share their money, they also ‘buy in’              
the cause of a political actor and are more inclined to dedicate their support to him or                 
her ( ​Kelly Garrett, 2006). Meanwhile, fundraising was underdeveloped on the websites           
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky to such extent that it can be considered marginal and thus              
fundraising is addressed here as a website-based ICT mobilization strategy in which            
only Alexei Navalny was involved to a considerable degree. During the interview            
representative of Khodorkovsky’s team confirmed that fundraising was seriously         
underdeveloped on respective website during all selected periods of time and have not             
improved significantly since then. She named three reasons for this state of affairs.             
First, image of Khodorkovsky implies that he should not not ask for money because he               
has them. Second, collection of donations presents logistical challenges because          
authorities interfere in this process. Finally, fundraising for Khodorkovsky’s projects          
puts those people who donate in a possible danger, since all private information is              
collected on RuNet. 
The main website of ​Anti-Corruption Foundation had many instances of fundraising           
activities during pre-EP. It had a wide donation module in the footer area of the main                
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page. The module gave wide range of options for donating. Users could choose one of               
five means of donation; choose if payment would be recurring or if it would be a one                 
time donation; and choose donation amount. 5oo rubbles and monthly payment were            
chosen by default. Three buttons replicated three options from the dropdown menu            
mentioned above, as well as supported by a button 'Another amount'. The module was              
present on webpages of sections 'Investigations', 'Surveys', 'Draft laws', and 'Foundation'           
(and its subsections). In addition, website had a red button 'Support the foundation' in              
the right conner of a default footer. Near to it - a dropdown menu with amount of                 
money to be donated. Clicking to the button 'Support the foundation' lead to the              
dropdown module, identical to the one that was provided in the footer area of the main                
page. Finally, default footer also had a text link in the 'How to help'. Clicking on it lead                  
to a separate webpage with the main donation module.  
Website of the campaign Illicit enrichment had a button 'Support ACF' with a message              
in the lower part of the webpage. Presented on webpages of sections 'Declarations',             
'Deputies about the article 20', 'Map of country houses'. Red 'Donate' button on the              
website Municipal Clan was supported with a message and logos of three out of five               
methods of donation. Button lead to a separate webpage with the main donation module.  
‘Sochi - map of expanses’ had a 'Donate' button in the right corner of default header.                
Though it is not visible on archived versions, HTML code of an up to date website                
corresponds to the code of archived one. The webpage had a section 'Report' in a form                
of a popup module. The right lower corner of the module was dedicated to donation.               
Traditionally for websites of the foundation, it had button with three sums of money.              
Unlike with modules in other webpages, it suggests larger amounts - 500, 1000 and              
3000 rubles. Project RosZhKH had a button 'Support the project in the right upper              
corner of the webpage. It lead to the drop down module, with the same functionality as                
main donation webpage. 
Apart from these deviations the following projects had similar master donation button in             
the footer area or footer of respective websites: Anticorruption Foundation, Illicit           
Enrichment, Black Notebook, Against Illegal Advertisement in Entrances. Blog of          
Alexei Navalny also had a red button 'Support projects' in the right sidebar.  
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Donation buttons usually lead to a unified donation webpage of the foundation.            
Sometimes they also were supported with messages. For example in case of the             
campaign Against Illegal Advertisement in Entrances the message stated 'If you like this             
project - support us.' 
Instead of support buttons, some projects had wide module in the lower area of the               
page: Against Illegal Advertisement in Entrances, Campaign Against Withdrawal of          
Pension Assets, RosYama (based on the analysis of HTML code) and Rosvynbory. 
Finally, in the case of Party of progress, its website had a wide module 'Support' with a                 
message that explained why donating to the party was not possible at a given point of                
time. It followed with a suggestion to support 'other interesting projects - in particular              
Anti Corruption Foundation' and a button 'Make a donation'.  
Several important conclusions can be made based on this detailed examination. 
Anti Corruption foundation was an ultimate destination for all fundraising activities of            
Alexei Navalny during pre-EP. Most of the donation buttons were coloured in red - the               
brand color of the Foundation. This color was also used for other action buttons, like               
‘Volunteer’. The fundraising efforts are developed, diverse and adopted to users’ needs.            
Such attention to this matter says about significance of the microdonations form of             
public fundraising for activities of the given political actor. 
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Section 3.2.2 
ICT mobilization strategies during post-electoral phase: September 18, 2016 -          
February 18, 2017 
Websites of many of the projects of both political actors have not undergone any              
structural changes during the post-EP. This section focuses on changes that took place             
and thus addresses only respective strategies and projects. If no changes occurred during             
this period of time, the project was omitted in this section. 
 
Section 3.2.2.1 
ICT mobilization strategies common for Khodorkovsky and Navalny during         
post-electoral phase 
 
During the post-EP a number of curios developmemts took place on the websites of              
Khodorkovsky and Navalny. During this period of time most of strategies stayed            
common for both actors, but certain considerable deviations were observed as well. 
Launch of the rebranded design of Open Russia in November 2016 was the most              
significant change in regard of website-based ICT mobilization strategies of Mikhail           
Khodorkovsky. During the interview, representative of his team stated that rebranding           
was needed in order to bring all the activity of Open Russia under one brand and thus                 
show that they all serve to one cause. 
The following important changes that serve a strategy of countering hegemonic           
discourse were introduced to the new design. All the main space of above the fold area                
(apart from default features), on all sections of the website was taken by a featured               
article. Such article could come from any of the sections of the website. In such a                
manner Khodorkovsky could promote materials that corresponded to his genda at a            
given point in time. A user had to pay due attention to a featured article, because above                 
the fold area did not have any other content. Section ‘Life’ became transformed into the               
section ‘Media’. It is still contained articles written by variety of authors (journalists,             
analysts, etc) for Open Russia or republished from other media platforms. Materials in             
this section had a number of views indicated in each material summary box. Analysis of               
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the HTML code proved that on archived website, number of comments and shares were              
indicated on each material page.  
Former section 'Community' was renamed into 'Blogs'. As previously, it was dedicated            
to materials published by registered users, who were involved in blogging. In new             
design this section started to look more professional and stylistically followed design of             
the ‘Media’ section. Any user could start a blog on open Russia. Up to date website                
suggests that this process was simplified. Section 'Events' consisted of articles that            
provided substantial coverage of past events.  
Materials in all sections ‘Media’ and ‘Blogs’ were labeled under the following            
categories: News, Society, Politics, Economy, History, Open Russia. In addition          
summary boxes of all materials on the website had indicator of number of views. In this                
manner the website demonstrated users, which materials received more attention.  
Email subscription as a tool for information dissemination remained on the website.            
Email subscription field called 'Subscribe to news' was moved to the right corner of the               
default footer on the main website openrussia.org and and websites of other projects -              
Instead of Putin and Open University.  
Meanwhile integration with social media was taken on a new level in the new design.               
Social media ‘Subscribe’ button was located in the footer area of the main website with               
indication of total number of subscribers. In addition to it, a button had a drop down                
menu with indication of each social media service. Similar buttons were identified in             
the footer area of websites of other projects: Instead of Putin, Legal Protection and              
Open Elections - (a single share button in the middle of footer area, and social media                
buttons in the side menu bar). Finally, Open Russia website curiously enough changed             
the main color from white to black. 
These examination demonstrates that two important features were introduced to the           
website in the post-EP. Certain aspects received quantifiable indication of their ‘quality’            
- number of subscribers, shares, comments. This approach indicates that Khodorkovsky           
was aiming at hitting appropriate numbers on the website and wanted to introduce some              
mechanism for measuring and showing quality of the content.  
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Website of the project Open University also underwent redesign. New design also            
appeared in November 2016. Main features came perform old functions in the new             
design. Email field called 'Subscribe to news' was moved to the right corner of the               
default footer, and still no social media buttons were introduced to the website.  
During post-EP on website administered by Mikhail Khodorkovsky more attention was           
given to the strategy of fostering deliberation online. According to the interviewee, the             
organisation understood that there is still a large audience that prefers to deliberate on              
the website and thus more attention was paid to this matter during rebranding. On Open               
Russia in addition to commenting section under every material, a number of comments             
was indicated on a material page in the header area. Though it is not visible on archived                 
versions, HTML code of up to date website corresponds to the code of archived one.               
The commenting section itself was enhanced and conducted via a plugin Disqus.            
Website of this service states that ‘Disqus helps publishers increase engagement and            
build loyal audiences’ (Disqus.com).  
Website of Open Elections was also redesigned in January 2017. Despite of significant             
structural changes, still no evidence of commenting feature was identified on any of             
sections and material pages of the website. Up to date version of the website confirms it.  
The fact that commenting was not enabled for two websites of the project after their               
redesign in post-EP indicates that administrators still deliberately wanted to keep them            
clean from admixtures of public opinion.  
In regard of the strategy of shaping idea of the political personality only one curious               
new aspect was identified during the post-EP. The link to openrussia.org that was earlier              
present in the right corner of the default footer on the the website earlier was removed.                
This confirm general trend of depersonalization of Open Russia as project that is             
increasingly presented as one that transcends political objectives of Mikhail          
Khodorkovsky (​Открытая Россия, 2017). 
Moving to the other strategy that was identified common for both political actors it is               
necessary to highlight that on Open Russia website news and media activities were             
taking on a new level. A special module was added to the left area of every section on                  
the website (Main page, Media, Blogs, Events). Module consisted of the latest news in a               
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chronological order. Near to a news title was located indication of time when it              
appeared on the website (e.g. 15 hours ago). All materials in this section were              
originally published on the website. On the one hand, it indicates that Open Russia was               
given a new function of the news outlet.  
With a new design, section Media (former ‘Life’) stayed news oriented. In combination             
with a news section ‘Events’, it provided coverage of Open Russia projects and             
socio-political developments that Open Russia was concerned about. News Section also           
appeared on the website Instead of Putin. It was captured by the WBM in february               
2017. By this time project was already six month old and it was logical to introduce a                 
section that would reflect its development.  
Regarding the strategy of collecting users personal data only a few changes were             
introduced. On the website of the Open Elections they occurred due to changes of the               
projects and design. The new information request section 'Ask the Question' (via email)             
was added to the webpage. Webpage consisted of the fields Email, Name and Question.              
It is natural that users would have a lot of questions dew to the changes in the project.  
During the post-EP website and nature of the electoral project Open Elections changed             
significantly. According to the archived version as of January 2017 that was captured by              
the WBM, project was transformed into the Moscow School of Candidates. The            
platform represented a landing page which described the idea of the school, it's program              
and conditions. The page also contained the buttons 'Join', which lead to the detailed              
registration form. During pre-EP the project was aimed at Parliamentary elections 2016            
and had a format of providing support to selected candidates. While, during post-EP it              
already was targeting at Regional elections 2017. The project took more formalized and             
diversified educational format and significantly extended the pool of beneficiaries. In           
addition, interviewee indicated that the project Open Russia Team developed because           
candidates supported by Open Russia during Parliamentary Elections ‘showed energy          
that they want to do more’. This energy lead to start of the Open Russia movement. 
 
 
 
59 
Section 3.2.2.2  
ICT mobilization strategies unique to Khodorkovsky and Navalny during         
post-electoral phase 
Though projects of Mikhail Khodorkovsky were marked only with one unique           
ICT-mobilization strategy, it was quite significant in terms of conversion of online            
mobilization into offline. ​In addition to section ‘Media’ and ‘Blogs’, a new section             
called 'Events' was added to the website. Though the name might suggest coverage of              
developments in Open Russia and other projects, this section transcended this area and             
was also dedicated to specific non-project events that. It provided structured           
information about lectures, campaigns, protest actions, debates, meetings etc. Page of           
each event contained name, address, time, and contact details of its organisers. It also              
have buttons 'I will go' and 'Add to calendar'. 'I will go button' allowed users to mark                 
that they will participate in a specific event. 
Traditionally to the new design, the featured upcoming event was highlighted in above             
the fold area. Summary boxes with links to the selected events were provided in              
chronological order. Section was focused on upcoming events, but also provided           
coverage of conducted ones. With help of this section Mikhail Khodorkovsky prompted            
users to participate in offline events that conformed with agenda of Mikhail            
Khodorkovsky. Wide range and detailed classification of events suggests that events in            
their turn also had different purposes. Including educational that can qualify as a             
strategy of countering hegemonic discourse. 
During post-EP the same four strategies were identified as un​ique to projects of Alexei              
Navalny, and they were marked with important new developments. Though the given            
changes are not structural, they are relevant from the perspective of elections. By             
February 2017, results of five more surveys were published in the section ‘Surveys’ on              
the Anti-Corruption Foundation Website. All of them were dedicated to Parliamentary           
Elections. By this means the Foundation reflected on the results of the elections. In              
addition, a new social media button was added to the website of Anti-Corruption. It was               
a button of social media Vkontakte - the most popular social network in the country. It                
was  added to the other social media buttons  
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located in the default footer area in February 2017. Though Vkontakte has a bad              
reputation and is controlled by state authorities, a significant portion of Navalny’s            
potential supporters can be reached by this means. 
In October 2016, Anti-Corruption Foundation launched ‘its awn media’, as it was stated             
on the blog of Alexei Navalny (Navalny.com, 2016). New section called 'Leviathan' was             
added to the website of the foundation. Though archived version does not show design              
of the page, according to the HTML codes it had the same structure as an uptodate                
website. The project represented a newswire, which collected 'absurd and weird and            
insane news about Russia and Russians’ (Navalny.com, 2016). News on the website            
were presented in chronological order. A wide module was dedicated to each piece of              
news. The module contained one-sentence description of the piece of news, link to news              
source and a share button to Facebook, Twitter, Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki. News            
were taken from external media sources, while content was curated. Section 'Calendar'            
allowed users to navigate through news groped for each day. Section 'Random piece of              
news' shuffled news. Section 'Suggest news' allowed users to submit a piece of news by               
filling in the respective form. The media is designed to bring ‘the dark side’ of the                
modern Russia to the spotlight (different shades of black is a deliberate choice for              
website’s background, as well as reference to the Biblical sea monster in name of the               
project). 
Email subscription on the website could be done if a user submited a piece of news. The                 
form had a box, ticked by default. In addition, website had social media buttons to               
Facebook, Twitter, Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki. They were located in the middle of            
lower area of the webpage and were duplicated in the middle of the default footer.               
Curiously, website contained a link to Alexei Navalny video blog on Youtube, which             
confirmed significance of this platform that was growing during post-EP. 
Certain changes that fall under strategy of countering hegemonic discourse also were            
introduced to the website of Alexei Navalny’s blog. In October 2017 Telegram and             
Youtube were added to the social media buttons module. In addition separate text link              
'Navalny in Twitter' appeared under all elements of the sidebar and in the section 'About               
navalny'.  
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Regarding strategy of shaping the idea of a political personality, subsections 'Answers            
to the questions’ was added to the section 'About Navalny' on his blog. It accompanied               
previously the only subsections 'Biography, family, activities'. The section was          
dedicated to a wide variety of questions related to position of the politician and issues               
related to it. Three people were listed as authors of the material: Alexei Navalny, Leonid               
Volkov and Vladimir Ashurkov. Here all three of them are indicated as representatives             
of the Party of Progress. This point sent a message that there is not only a team behind                  
Alexei Navalny, but also a political party - two elements needed for his ideas to be                
implemented. 
During post-EP a new key website was added to the matrix of websites of Alexei               
Navalny. It was dedicated to his presidential campaign 2018 and was given a respective              
name - 2018.navalny.com. It became his core electoral project. 
Above the fold area had a wide baner with his photo and a slogan of campaign 'Alexei                 
Navalny - Time to Choose'. The banner was supported by a long message and a link to                 
video with Navalny's appeal. Next came a module that highlighted achievements of the             
politician. Three summary boxes consisted of image and name of a respective            
achievement. Hovering over boxes revealed a description of achievement. To the right            
of this module the following text links were provided: 'Alexei Navalny: truth against             
Kremlin propaganda' and 'Why Alexei Navalny should participate in elections'. The           
middle of the main mage had a long text with messages from the actor. It was followed                 
by a slider module with key points of his program. The slider module had six units.                
Each unit consisted of a message and description of the program point. Social media              
buttons to Facebook, Twitter, Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki were located in the default            
footer area of the webpage. In addition, the website served a strategy of collection of               
personal data. Above the fold area had long message that was followed by a              
subscription module with a field for email. Subscribe button was named 'Join'. The             
module was replicated in the middle of the webpage. 
The important strategy of fundraising was developed during post-EP on several           
plattform. Curiously enough it meant reducing the number of fundraising modules. The            
detailed donation module in the footer area of the Anti-Corruption Foundation was            
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removed from the footer area of sections 'Investigations', 'Surveys', 'Draft laws' and            
'Foundation'.  
The website Navalny 2018 had a wide fundraising module that located in the lower area               
of the page. It had a detailed message justifying need for donating. Then followed              
buttons to four different means of donation: Yandex Money, Bank card, Paypal and             
Bitcoin. 
During post-EP website of the ACF project RosZhKH was redesigned. Meanwhile,           
despite significant changes in design, no structural changes that should have been taken             
into account were introduced. 
 
Section 3.3 
ICT mobilizations strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny during pre-electoral         
phase and role of location: comparative analysis 
 
Zooming out from comparative analysis of specific aspects of website-based ICT           
mobilization strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny, now it is necessary to look at             
them from the perspective of the independent variable. Here more attention is paid to              
what these actors have been doing differently in order to understand whether differences             
were caused by location. 
As it was stated earlier, though both actors were involved in countering hegemonic             
discourse, the manner oh how they have been doing it differed to a significant extent. 
During pre-EP Mikhail Khodorkovsky already paid due attention to the contribution to            
counter-hegemonic discourse made by users. The oppositional movement lead by          
Khodorkovsky is targeted at creation of the strong network of supporters, who can have              
various relation to Open Russia. The movement that emerged in a crystallized form after              
the Parliamentary elections 2016 is branded as open network movement. Contribution           
to the counter-hegemonic discourse advanced by Khodorkovsky is a form of belonging            
to the movement.  
Khodorkovsky representative stated in the interview that ultimate goal of Mikhail           
Khodorkovsky is to convince a critical mass of about 30% of Russians that current              
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political regime is flawed and needs to be changed, which should lead country to              
peaceful democratic opening. After that first truly democratic elections are to be held.             
What comes to the political ambition of Mikhail Khodorkovsky himself, interviewee           
told that he is willing to take the role of ‘crisis manager’ who would lead the country                 
through democratic opening and to the elections. Now, looking at this information from             
the perspective of the research puzzle, it is reasonable to assume that exile is beneficial               
for Khodorkovsky. The image of him as a political personality is at least controversial              
in Russia, and branding of Open Russia as Khodorkovsky organisation can have            
negative effect on it position. Being in exile Khodorkovsky does not have to be in the                
spotlight of the media attention and is able to operate from shadows. The fact that he                
recently officially resigned from the position of head of Open Russia, confirms logic of              
this argument (Открытая Россия, 2017). Curiously enough, during the conference,          
when Khodorkovsky stated about his decision to leave the position he said the following              
‘We are going to set an example to society that it is possible to build the future by                  
ourselves, without leaders’ (Открытая Россия, 2017). The clear tendency for          
depersonalization can be observed here and location is a contributing factor to this             
tendency. The nature of Khodorkovsky’s exile and its causes make it unreasonable to             
personalize his oppositional movement. In addition, Khodorkovsky representative told         
that Russian pro-governmental media actively uses that narrative that since          
Khodorkovsky left the country he lost connection with its people and thus should not              
have saying regarding what future of Russia should look like.  
The project Instead of Putin also was going in conformity with this agenda, but instead               
of average users, people with higher profile were introduced to the respective discourse             
by mere nomination on the website. If Khodorkovsky would indeed personalize his            
oppositional movement he would need conditions under which operated Alexei          
Navalny. 
Countering hegemonic discourse through websites of Alexei Navalny was largely          
concentrated around its primary activities. On the one hand these activities had an             
offline nature (anti-corruption investigations), while on the other hand – the activities            
were focused on providing population with tools of tackling negative consequences of            
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corruption. Projects of Alexei Navalny were working for strengthening positions of           
political personality. Since had high political ambitions, which eventually lead him           
starting the presidential campaign in late 2016, Alexei Navalny had to demonstrate to             
potential supporters that he not only can reveal perpetrations conducted by current            
political regime, but also can offer way to improve well-being of the potential             
supporters. Such improvement was offered in form of basic solving issues with utility             
services to proposing draft laws against corruption. Because Navalny was operating           
inside of Russia he could aspire for the highest position in the country. Exile creates               
serious obstacles for such intentions. In particular through estrangement from the           
people, lack of legitimacy, resistance from government and practical constraints of           
conducting legitimate elections. 
Deliberation online is a website-based ICT mobilization strategy that was indirectly           
affected by location of Khodorkovsky and Navalny. Nature of activities of these            
oppositional leaders had more direct impact on their strategies regarding deliberation           
online. As it was elaborated earlier, the major goal of Mikhail Khodorkovsky is creation              
of a grassroot cluster of supporters that would increase chances of regime change in              
Russia. For that reason deliberation online fostered on the websites of this actor to such               
a high degree, especially during post-EP with launch of the new design of Open Russia               
website. It is evident that development and spreading of ideas that would contribute to              
the process of democratisation was a major goal of deliberation online. At the same              
time, deliberation online was much less present on websites of Alexei Navalny.            
Websites of his activities targeted at combating corruption were kept pure from            
feedback from public. Such approach provides political leaders with high control over            
the image created by means of these platforms. Such websites perform role of             
campaigning tools not only during electoral cycle. Commercial projects have similar           
approach with one-way interaction with their target groups. The only Navalny’s           
platform where users were welcomed to deliberate online was his blog. On the one              
hand, it is likely that faithful audience of likeminded supporters involved in discussions             
on the blog will support his ideas, while on the other hand moderation of online               
discussion on the website allows to keep it in desired direction. 
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The website-based ICT mobilization strategy of shaping idea of a political personality is             
also only indirectly influenced by location. Nature of this strategy depends on activities             
of political leaders and their political objectives. Meanwhile impact of location also            
could be observed. The idea of political personality of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was            
predominantly shaped via his website Khodorkovsky.ru. Here oppositional leader often          
appears as a member of international dialog. Due to his exile status and critique towards               
Putin’s regime he is presented as an oppositional leader who is accepted and supported              
by the West. In this sense location of Khodorkovsky has significant impact on the              
respective website-based ICT mobilization strategy. 
Certain aspects of the other strategy labeled under ‘News and media activities’ were             
influenced by location. Section about Russia on the Open Russia website was dedicated             
to publications about Russia in foreign media. It served a purpose to introduce opinion              
about current political regime and developments in Russia that was present in the             
discourse of foreign countries. As it was stated earlier, Khodorkovsky was marketing            
himself as an oppositional political actor accepted by the West. Foreign opinion            
translated into Russian and presented on his key website comes in conformity with that.              
Being in exile Khodorkovsky had to recognise influence of one of four tires - the               
hosting Western community (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009). At the same time Alexei            
Navalny stayed ignorant about attention and courtesies done towards him from the side             
of foreign Western countries. For those who pursue regime change in Russia,            
collaboration with Navalny could be considered as a promising approach. Meanwhile,           
for him it could hurt aspirations for legitimacy. Russian hegemonic discourse presents            
those who are against Putin’s regime as agents of the West, that tries to deteriorate the                
statehood of Russian Federation (Amnesty International).  
Recruiting is one of website-based ICT mobilization strategies significantly affected by           
location for both oppositional actors. At the same time presence of other factors has also               
to be recognised. As it was in detailed elaborated in the section on empirical              
examination, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was using his websites predominantly for         
recruiting activists. This approach comes in conformity with his intention to build            
grassroot cluster of supporters. Being in exile Khodorkovsky needed a group of trusted             
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activists who could become field managers of the oppositional movements. At the same             
time Alexei Navalny was recruiting volunteers with similar intention - creation of            
cluster of faithful supporters who would become basis for perspectives to get the             
presidential position. Recruiting activists could result in nurturing potential competitors          
while making emphasis on volunteers would bring potential voters. Contribution of           
personal time becomes even stronger guarantee for commitments than contribution of           
money. Moreover, approach to recruiting volunteers was significantly personalized.         
Each applicant should have experience the feeling that Navalny and his organisations            
are particularly interested in what makes distinguished him or her from other; that they              
value unique personal contribution that each applicant could make to the cause. In this              
manner physical proximity between Alexei Navalny and his supporters resulted from           
his location inside Russia was enhanced further. At the same time, depersonalisation            
and delineation of Mikhail Khodorkovsky from his target audience was enhanced by            
means of the buffer formed from loyal activists.  
Legislative activities of Alexei Navalny were highly related to his activities on            
combating corruption. On the one hand he sent a message that problem of corruption              
has to be addressed on the legislative level and he has a capacity to propose respective                
legislative initiatives. On the other hand, Navalny demonstrated that he recognises           
issues with population well-being that in his opinion are a symptoms of corruption, and              
that he can help people to address these issues. These two approach were needed to               
enhance his ambitious political aspirations and demonstrate that he is a right person to              
become a president. This overall strategy would be highly improbable and insufficient            
to be conducted from exile.  
Exposure of perpetrations and exposure of issues related to populations well-being (as            
well as addressing them) were developed to such a degree that they were identified as               
two unique website-based ICT mobilization strategies of Alexei Navalny.  
Nature of Electoral project was dictated by goals of Khodorkovsky and Navalny and             
whether they were going to participate in elections directly or indirectly. Due to his              
exile Mikhail Khodorkovsky could participate in elections only indirectly. Thus nature           
of his electoral projects was revolving around providing support to those activists who             
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could participate in elections directly. At the same time, being inside of Russia Navalny              
had all reasons to participate in directions directly, but since his political party - Party of                
Progress - was derived from official registration ironically he appeared in similar            
situation. Meanwhile, Alexey Navalny had no reason to provide significant support to            
other oppositional political forces. Instead he was carefully engaged with the           
Democratic Coalition - fragile alliance of oppositional forces that planned to unite for             
Parliamentary Elections 2016. When the coalition started to fall apart, Alexei Navalny            
further estranged himself from its affairs. It would be imprudent to involve in             
controversial cases when he already had aspiration for next national election -            
Presidential ones.  
Fundraising is a peculiar ICT mobilization strategy. Both presence and          
underdevelopment of it on websites of political actors gives auspicious background for            
considerations regarding the impact of location. As it was in detailed addressed earlier,             
projects of Alexei Navalny were actively involved in fundraising. Financial reputation           
of this political actor does not imply presence of significant financial resources, Thus, to              
fund his activities Alexei Navalny needs to collect donations from population.           
Moreover, it is apparent that he understands value of microdonations as way for users to               
‘buy in’ his cause. Because Alexei Navalny operates in Russia and publicly refrains             
from financial or other forms of relationship with foreign stakeholders, Navalny indeed            
has to rely on sources provided by supporters. 
At the same time, being in exile Mikhail Khodorkovsky is more flexible with financial              
sources. Having liberty to operate with his own financial sources, he potentially can             
collaborate with other stakeholder. Moreover, because he is not in Russia,           
Khodorkovsky money are rather a subject of stipulations than to official scrutiny from             
Russian government.  
Empirical examination demonstrated that logical assumption that website-based ICT         
mobilization strategies of Khodorkovsky and Navalny converged during the post-EP          
was false. Certain differences observed during the two phases of electoral period            
concerned development in already present strategies. 
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Conclusions 
 
In order to identify which website-based ICT mobilization strategies were affected by            
location during the electoral period, a comprehensive mapping of all websites           
administered by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei Navalny was conducted. This          
enquiry revealed complex interplay of various factors that affect these strategies, and            
location was proved to be one of these factors. The main reason of differences is ability                
of inability of physical presence in the country.  
Exile status triggers a chain of consequences that range from estrangement from the             
people’s preferences, inability to built personal relationship with target groups by means            
of direct contact with their representatives and practical obstacles in realization of            
desired actions. In addition, exile puts a political leader under higher influence from the              
international community. In the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky he appeared in between            
rhetorics of Russia and the West. As it was indicated in the research, discourse matters               
because it is not primary whether an oppositional leader was involved in unpopular             
actions, but whether members of his target audience shares such an opinion. 
Since Mikhail Khodorkovsky appeared in exile he had to adopted his political            
objectives to the new status and its implications. This in its turn resulted in deviations in                
regard of website-based ICT mobilization strategies as it was evident during comparison            
of cases of Alexei Navalny.  
Due to inability to participate in elections directly, several strategies of Mikhail            
Khodorkovsky were aiming at creation of a grassroot cluster of supporters. From this             
perspective, growing number of such supporters until a sufficient level would lead            
Russia to the regime change. Consequently, website-based ICT mobilization strategies          
of countering hegemonic discourse, fostering deliberation online, recruiting, as well as           
conducting legal and electoral projects were determined by this factor. Inability to            
participate in elections directly and nature of exile also lead to deliberate            
depersonalization of the oppositional movement, which in its turn affects such           
website-based ICT mobilization strategy as shaping idea of a political personality.  
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At the same time Alexei Navalny was located in Russia during the electoral period that               
also affected his political activities. Unlike Khodorkovsky, he early expressed the           
ambition of direct participation in elections and even running for the main position in              
Russia. Being physically present in the country and thus having ability to exercise his              
charisma on potential supporters, Alexei Navalny concentrated his activities on          
anticorruption crusade. Website-based ICT mobilization strategies served a channel to          
present process and results of these activities. On the on hand, Navalny demonstrated             
that he has educated and complex approach to the issue of corruption and is prepared to                
combat it on the level of legislature. On the other hand, he understood that talking about                
distant legal matters is not going to win him support of masses, whose wellbeing is               
affected by corruption in Russia. Thus, key website-based ICT mobilization strategies           
of Alexei Navalny were targeted at exposing perpetrations and exposing and addressing            
issues related to population wellbeing. These two strategies worked as contrast shower            
by demonstration of ‘positive’ consequences of corruption enjoyed by state officials and            
negative - of which suffers majority of Russian citizens. 
Testing of sub hypothesis revealed that involvement in campaigning during pre-EP does            
not lead to convergence in regard of website-based ICT mobilization strategies.           
Meanwhile, selected cases are not entirely appropriate for testing this logical           
assumption. Due to personalized political objectives of Alexei Navalny, he was not            
highly involved in Russian Parliamentary elections 2016. If the cases with two            
oppositional leaders both participating in elections in similar manner (directly or           
indirectly) can be identified, it could be useful to test this assumption. 
Website-based ICT mobilization strategies are designed to transcend physical borders          
and boundaries and thus they should be less affected by location then, for example              
offline mobilization strategies. Meanwhile website based ICT-mobilizations strategies        
are affected by offline activities, which in their turn are more directly influenced by              
location. Untangling of the interrelations between multiple factors that influence online           
mobilization strategies is task for further research. In order to clearly prove that certain              
ICT mobilization strategies are influenced by location, more appropriate cases shall be            
identified. Meanwhile, political realities do not always supply socials scientists with           
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well established and clearly delineated cases. Instead, it often sets a task to give answers               
to such questions with existing cases. Nevertheless, social science has to investigate            
them because scientific inquiry is capable of revealing which methods of political            
mobilization prove to be more effective and what kind of side effects can be invoked by                
often utilitarian approach of political leaders to mass mobilization. 
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Appendix 1 
Website-based ICT mobilization strategies of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei 
Navalny during electoral period: March 18, 2016 - March 18, 2017. EXTENDED 
VERSION 
 
ICT ACTIVITIES (STRATEGIES) PRE-ELECTO
RAL PHASE 
POST-ELECT
ORAL PHASE 
Category Kh. N. Kh. N. 
1. Countering hegemonic discourse 
a. content prepared by   
political actors (ordered by    
websites administration) 
b. content prepared by users    
(approved by websites   
administration) 
Yes 
 
a,b 
Yes 
 
a 
Yes 
 
a,b 
Yes 
 
b 
  2.      Fostering deliberation online yes yes yes yes 
  3.      Shaping idea of a political 
personality 
yes yes yes yes 
  4.      Perpetrations exposure no yes no yes 
  5.       Exposing and addressing issues 
with population well- being 
a. Collection of complaints   
from population 
b. Demonstration of impact   
of solving problems 
no yes no yes 
  6.      News and media activities yes yes yes yes 
  7.      Informing about non-project 
events 
a. about future events 
no no yes no 
79 
b. about past events 
  8.     Recruiting 
a. Activists 
b. Volunteers  
yes  
a 
yes  
b 
yes  
a 
yes  
b 
  9.      Fundraising No  yes no yes 
  10.    Collecting users personal data 
a. Registration of user   
accounts for online   
activities on a website 
b. Providing of data for    
participation in offline   
activities 
yes yes yes yes 
  11.    Conducting legal projects 
a. Legal projects 
b. Legislative initiatives 
yes yes yes yes 
  12.    Conducting electoral projects 
a. Candidates application for   
support 
b. Channel for users to    
provide support to   
candidates 
c. other forms of engagement    
in elections 
yes yes yes yes 
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaire for in-depth interview with high-ranking representative of Mikhail         
Khodorkovsky team 
 
1. What impact does exile has on the mobilization conducted in framework of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky projects, like Open Russia and Instead of Putin?  
 
2. How exile effects ICT mobilization strategies of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 
particularly carried out via websites?  
 
3. Do you consider content published on Open Russia website as an attempt to 
counter hegemonic discourse? 
 
4. Why such significant attention is paid to deliberation of users online on the new 
design of Open Russia website, launched in November 2016? 
 
5. Please, comment on the recruiting conducted via websites of Open Elections, 
Instead of Putin.  Why recruiting is targeted predominantly at activists?  
 
6. New design of openrussia.org, released on November 2016 has a news section. 
Does it makes Open Russia an additional function of a news platform? 
 
7. In the period during October 2015 until February 2016 Open Russia project 
legal protection was carried out in collaboration with Alexei Navalny. Why this 
collaboration was ceased? Did it change nature of the project?  
 
8. Why fundraising is so scarce on websites of Mikhail Khodorkovsky? 
 
9. Would you say that there were any difference in discussed ICT mobilization 
strategies in the period before elections on September 18 2016, and after it? 
 
10. Would mobilization be done differently if Mikhail Khodorkovsky was in 
Russia? Are there some mobilization strategies or activities that are not 
appropriate or not reasonable for carrying out from exile? 
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